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ABSTRACT
Talbot Brewer’s Retrieval of Ethics and Robert Adams’s Finite and Infinite Goods
present distinct theories in ethics and metaethics. Brewer begins with the fundamental ethical
perspective of the practical deliberator who experiences his practical deliberations as a
continuous, unified, and constantly revised activity which begins with inchoate intimations of
goodness and proceeds better or worse to understand and pursue the goodness which pervades
his evaluative outlook. From this Brewer aims to account for how we achieve excellence in
practical deliberation and arrive at a more tenable and self-consistent evaluative outlook which
informs our ethical deliberations. Alternately, Adams begins in the linguistic community and the
role suggested by our ordinary language which ‘good’. From this a deeply metaphysical account
is developed of ordinary goods as, in a sense, parasitic on a transcendent and infinite good to
which their intelligibility is owed and upon which traditional moral notions of obligation and the
like are appealingly based.
This thesis argues that each theory, though similar, has distinct strengths and weaknesses
which might complement each other in a synthetic theory strengthened by both. Adams’s
transcendent Good, while it secures objectivity and maximal sharedness, lacks a criterion for
higher and lower order goods. Brewer’s epistemology couched in practical reason, while
establishing an intriguing picture of the good human life, lacks a firm grounding outside the
individual to avoid subjectivism. My solution is to push the two theories together with a
dialectical criterion for Adams and a notion of the transcendent community for Brewer.
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CHAPTER I
PROBLEMS IN ROBERT ADAMS’S FINITE AND INFINITE GOODS
I. Introduction
Finite and Infinite Goods is equal parts metaphysical and ethical. The metaphysics grows
from the semantics of goodness to a Platonist/theist theory of transcendent Goodness in God and
its explanatory power in ethical thought. The ethics takes the good as primary, but focuses on
excellence, understood as Godlikeness, as the ethical concept it sees as essential to a system of
ethics. Well-being and human values are constituted by excellence, love for excellence is the
best explanation of the ethical ordering of value, and the excellence of social relations grounds
morality. The transcendent excellence of God is fully immersed in Finite’s ethical framework;
metaphysics and ethics are never far apart.
The theory could be said to front-load its ethical content into a maximally thick standard
of goodness and then unpack its content’s place in relevant ethical positions. To put the point
structurally, it appears to be a top-down, as opposed to a bottom-up, sort of ethics: the character
of the qualitatively highest and quantitatively lowest goods determines the place of the lower
goods. The problem with putting it this way is that the place of transcendence expands the
standard of the qualitatively highest goods such that ‘excellent’ and ‘good’ are nearly
contiguous. In this chapter, I first argue that Finite has expanded the ordinary notion of
excellence by his semantic metaphysics and the application of a transcendent perspective as a
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criterion of what is worthy of love. I then demonstrate that this expansion of excellence
produces unsatisfactory results in Adams’s ethical theory. I conclude that Finite is deficient in
an account of the rough, but intuitive, distinction between higher and lower excellences and offer
a sketch of what features the needed account would possess.
II. Summary
This section gives a summary of Finite’s foundational metaphysics of value and the
ethical framework built on top of it. Adams’s epistemology and political considerations are not
included here, because they would add further baggage to an already strained effort and are
largely subsidiary and unessential to the ethical theory.
II.1 Metaphysics: supernaturalistic realism and the transcendent Good
Adams begins Finite by proposing “a framework for ethics that is organized around a
transcendent Good and its relation to the many finite goods of our experience.”1 The finite goods
are those we experience as, broadly defined, excellent. The transcendent Good is the infinitely
good God. The transcendent Good is introduced as a best fit for the nature of ‘good’ suggested
by the role such a nature must play in semantic use. Finite’s metaphysics is an effort to co-opt
semantic role naturalistic metaphysics by replacement of naturalism with supernaturalism.
Adams puts his semantic argument: “What is given by the meaning… of the words, is a role that
the nature is to play. If there is a single candidate that best fills the role, that will be the nature of
the thing.”2 To avoid anti-realist or emotivist conclusions, Adams curtails his study to good
meant as excellent. Realism about the transcendent Good arrives at the semantic level “insofar
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as our actual way of discoursing about the good seems plausible.”3 This semantically founded
realism is built from the linguistic treatment of statements involving ‘good’ as applicable to rules
of logic and assertions of fact.
Experiences of finite goods (good and excellent will hereon be interchangeable when
referring to their place Finite) are fragmentary glimpses of the transcendent Good and their
excellence is best understood as imaging various transcendently excellent features of this infinite
Good. The one thing which adequately fills the role suggested by the diverse array of ‘good’
predications (whether of airplanes, mountains, or relationships) is a transcendent Good which
exemplifies and shares all of the excellent features we pick out among them. The excellence of a
particular thing fits the fragmentary phenomenon of our experiences of goods and their
seemingly massive disparity of qualities by fragmentarily imaging features of the transcendent
Good. Various goods are suitably related without reduction to any apparently shared property,
because godlikeness is a metaphysical abstraction from the instances of excellence. In this way,
Adams’s transcendence thesis fits usage’s surface suggestion of unity by offering an ordering
relation among all genuine goods.
Transcendence is supported by an epistemology of value which places empirical testing
and scientific reasoning within the broader “web of commonsense belief and judgment in which
science is embedded and on which [they] inescapably depend.”4 Evaluative belief formation and
an adequate agreement between evaluators in the linguistic community on central cases are
inescapable aspects of truth. Adams takes this farther by insisting that a critical stance on ethical
beliefs is essential to any mature ethical understanding. The naturalistic realist cannot account
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for this ethical feature because it is forsworn by any imagined identification of value with a
property cluster.5 Adams asserts that a supernaturalistic realist account of good which can
accommodate our epistemic shortcomings and the importance of the critical stance will be a
theory of transcendence.
II.2 Ethics: excellence and love for the good
Application of the transcendence thesis shapes an ethical theory which takes excellence
and love as its foundational concepts. On Adams’s view, a person’s well-being is a life
characterized by enjoyment of the excellent. He arrives at this view from the perspective of a
loved-one, specifically the common-sense perspective of what a parent should judge good for
their child; the kind of life for their child which would satisfy their love.6 Adams takes it that
good parents want their children to live enjoyable, excellent lives. Neither enjoyment nor
excellence alone will suffice. Since what is good for a person is a life filled with appreciation of
excellences and these excellences connect to facets of the divine nature, a person’s well-being is
constituted by a life closely tied to transcendence.
The value of persons as persons is secured by their being ontologically sacred. That is,
people and their rights must be treated as sacred because of what they are. The sacred is
explained as an ontological category by dint of the strength of its transcendent resemblance
relation. The strongest indicator of this sacredness, outside of love, is our sense of moral horror
in the violation of the sacred. This sense of horror expands the scope of the sacred to, e.g., nonhuman works of art and environments and requires their incorporation to ethical thinking. What
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is truly sacred and violative is only vaguely articulable, but the scope is defined by this sense of
moral horror.
Adams’s ethical framework takes on a more substantive dress in his arguments that it is
good to love the good. Love plays double duty in Finite both as an essential half of its
motivational ideal and in the conceptual delimitation of excellence’s purview. Since God’s love
is the standard of love, what God finds worthy of love is the standard of excellence. Love is both
particular and universal and defies self-interest/altruistic bifurcation, though it is always selfregarding in its relational content. The ideal love possesses both Eros, which depends on the
desire for an intrinsically valued relation to an excellent thing, and grace, which is unconstrained
in its proportion to excellence. Individuals (human and non-human) are loved for their
excellence, a universal property, but are loved in themselves and not for the sake of this
excellence. God’s love is maximally universal and particular in loving all particulars of value in
creation. Not only persons, but also human artifacts like art and relationships, impersonal
objects like animals and plants, and universals like truth and beauty are fit objects of love and are
thus excellent in a fragmentary way.
This is the keystone of love and the definition of excellence, though by human limitations
we can only love or find excellent a very limited range of things, which generates the problem of
personal ordering. The wide range of values subsumed under excellence allows the
defragmentation of value by an ideal of love for excellence as such. This is important to avoid
the value-fragmenter’s dilemma between the bland domination of aesthetic or intellectual value
by moral or political value and the absurdity of irresolvable intrapersonal conflicts between types
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of value.7 The solution is found in the ideal of a person possessing a general disposition to value
good things; it disposes her to recognize goods generally and generates attitudes of loving,
liking, or respecting all of those goods of which she is aware because of this recognition.8 A
person’s values become integrated by the highest-order motivational ideal, explicitly or
implicitly accepted, of being for, or loving, the good as such.9 Because of our human limitations
and inescapable helplessness in fortune’s wake, the symbolic value (as opposed to consequential
value) of our actions and attitudes is essential to this ideal’s expression.10
II.3 Morality: obligations as social requirements and relations with the transcendent Good
Moral value is secured a place in this ordering by its necessarily strong weight,
negatively grounded in the concept of idolatry, in the motivational ideal of being for the good.
Any love for a finite good which is not compatible with moral obligations is idolatrous because it
is competing with this ideal and is integration by a non-transcendent good.11 It is combated by
the critical stance (which previously secured transcendence against naturalistic reduction) in its
filtering and questioning of commitments and values motivated by the humble recognition that
one’s idea of the good falls infinitely short of actually understanding transcendence.
Moral obligations are grounded in the value of a social relation with something that has
value and can only be understood in a social context.12 The importance of obligations, their
‘oughtness’, takes off from a Millian theory of duty indicated by deserts of social or legal
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punishment for actions or inactions.13 Obligations are negatively indicated externally by
blaming and alienation and internally by feelings of guilt, not shame. Obligatory actions arise
from reasons of social requirement in actual, articulated demands and are expressions of the
value of the social relations which generate them.14
Obligations of personal demands often conflict and arise from imperfectly good relations.
To solve this issue, Adams posits a divine command theory idealization of social requirement
which “covers the whole territory of moral obligations”.15 Divine commands issue from the
transcendent Good which underpins all goodness in the context of a maximally excellent loving
relationship between God and individuals. The values of the demander, the demands, and the
relationship which generates the demands are maximally excellent, objective, just, and fair.
These features, coupled with epistemic access for those who are obliged, support a divine
command over divine will formulation, because it leaves room for supererogation16 and because
God will not command acts which fall outside his nature. Abraham’s dilemma and any problem
of autonomy are both bypassed because the interpretation of divine commands must be filtered
through the critical stance.17 Thus, God’s nature must be incorporated into any understanding of
the commands.
III. The Breadth and Depth of Excellence and Love
The arguments of this chapter depend, as criticisms always do, on their target’s aptness to
criticism. In this section I focus on the character of excellence and love as they are developed in
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Finite. When the roles of these concepts and their relations are drawn out, a picture of
excellence and love appears which is exceptionally stretched.
III.1 Excellence as highest good, love as highest appreciation
When ‘excellent’ is predicated of a thing, the intuitive meaning of the assertion is that the
thing is more than good— it is among highest of goods of its kind. If someone tells me a movie
is excellent and I trust their judgment, I expect the movie to be exceptionally good. Excellent
scissors are sharp, comfortable, smooth and durable; merely good scissors might only be sharp
and durable. This is the meaning of good-as-excellence we bring to the table of Finite, because it
is the meaning by which we reason and express. Likewise, we mean in saying we love
something, if we are not being hyperbolic, that we have our highest appreciation of the thing.
We like and respect many things, but we love comparatively few things. Intuitively, we only
truly love those things which possess a certain degree of excellence that makes them stand out.
At a general level, there are of course many types of loves and excellences, different in degree
and importance.
These are the acme of goods and attitudes with which Adams appears to builds his ethics.
They seem to share, at least linguistically, some common trait that Adams seeks to explain in
theistically Platonic fashion by relating them to an exemplar in the ‘Form of excellence’ which is
also a lover. Finite’s framework appears to be guided by the superlative sense of excellence
sketched above; many of the examples are very high goods indeed. Adams, with Plato, takes
beauty to be the paradigmatic example of such excellence. It is indicated by its ability to
sometimes overwhelm our understanding and emotions, taken as the phenomenological indicator
of transcendence. It is that which is worthy of “love or admiration, honor or worship” whose
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goodness is exemplified in “a sunset, painting, mathematical proof, or the greatness of a
novel”.18
The place of love seems to share this superlative status by the high standards Finite
imposes. Love for a good begins by inspiring admiration, but comes to be a desire for relation,
often valued for its own sake, to the good which inspires it. Love can be reciprocal or one-sided
and can generate in any number of reasons, but is always beyond complete articulation. Love is
indicated by both valuing its object as excellent and outstripping this valuing, and negatively by
never valuing its object primarily for the sake of another love. Love in the ideal meets Buber’s
“I-Thou” relationship, “It fills the firmament—not as if there were nothing else, but everything
else lives in its light.”19 The central case of love is for persons, who must be loved as excellent,
yet cannot be loved comparatively for, or only for the sake, their excellence. The interpersonal
ideal is Hesed, which is “extravagantly firm and open-ended, grounded in a non-comparative,
unmeasured, but not necessarily uncritical valuing of the person.”20
III.2 A transcendent ideal and the burden of egalitarianism
In light of what has been said so far, one would be inclined to think that Adams uses the
ordinary, superlative usage of excellence to create an ethical framework which is as finitely, as
infinitely, ‘top-down’. On first impression, Finite sketches a metaphysical exemplar and then
holds this transcendently exemplary excellence and love as the theoretical standard to a practical
ethical standard which is correspondingly high. This is not where Finite arrives. At their
extremes, the practical standards of excellence and love are stretched to maximal breadth and
minimal depth. Among the more distant in this range of appropriate objects of love and
18
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excellence are: “particular animals, plants, and other natural objects; species and other natural
kinds”, light passing through leaves, bad art, cars, meals, breath, and biological diversity.21
The causes of Finite’s expansionary policy, as I see it, are two: (1) the burden of
egalitarianism and (2) standards sculpted by an ideal of transcendence, itself derived from a
semantic gloss. The first is relatively minor and will receive a quick treatment, while the second
is the more important and will consume the rest of the section. Finite’s expansion of excellence
can be seen in part as an effort to dilute excellence of its illiberal connotations. Adams notes that
ethics of intrinsic excellence were, until recently, viewed with suspicion.22 These suspicions are
cited as founded in egalitarian concerns conjured by the prima facie exclusivity of excellence.
Adams shares these egalitarian pre-theoretical commitments and at several points in Finite, is
careful to qualify and expand the meaning of excellence to accommodate them. This is his
explicit concern in the value of persons as persons, in allowing the excellence of bad art to avoid
snobbery, and in denying that economic inequality and excellence are tied together.23 These
points of contact are not structurally essential, but they do offer a glimpse into Adams’s larger
motivations.
The real cause of the expansion of excellence is found in Adams’s employment of
transcendence as an ethical ideal. The process begins in its gloss of the gargantuan disparities
between the senses of love and excellence as they are said or felt of different things. Loves for
frogs and pine trees are not really the same kinds of love as loves for spouses or life projects.
When I say a scissors is excellent, I do not really mean the same sort of excellence said of my
best friend. By assuming a single metaphysical role from the surface structure of such distinct
21
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linguistic usage, whatever similarities exist between these things eclipses their differences.
Seemingly, the only sense of similarity between an excellent muffin and an excellent husband is
that they are higher goods of their kind, but this sense is just the kind thrown out by Adams’s
metaphysical extrapolation.
It can be granted that the problems with gloss are not insoluble and that Adams’s
argument moves forward successfully from semantic use to metaphysical nature to his
transcendence thesis. After all, the transcendent Good’s love and excellence are assembled from
those exemplary excellences mentioned in III.2. The extension of excellence could not really
come at that stage, because, regardless of glossing, Adams’s works with existent practical ideals
to a metaphysical ideal which transcends any understanding. It makes sense that from a God’s
eye view, the value of birds and persons is not as different as we imagine. God might also
rightly be said to have a sort of relational love with all of his creation, too. A lizard’s
consciousness is intelligible to God, though it is unintelligible to us. As a metaphysical thesis
taken from the ability of persons to value and dearly appreciate nearly anything, transcendence
does not seem to be stretching at all.
So it is not, per se, the metaphysical thesis which is the cause. Rather, it is the move
from the transcendent ideal back to ethical theory which generates the extension of excellence.
Specifically, it is the transcendent love applied as a criterion of love and value which is the
cause. The transcendent Good is “importantly like a person” in that it loves, judges, and
commands. Because it is unlimited in its abilities and goodness, its love has a universality that
recognizes a certain degree of value in every non-bad portion of its creation. Because this
appreciative view of value is the definitive criterion for all loves and all finite excellences are
equally infinitely far from the transcendent Good, the concepts of love and excellence are opened
11

up to maximal scope. The sense of these concepts began in their higher form: love in the closest
interpersonal relationships; excellence in the profundity of a favorite novel. They ended in a
form quite distant from these, in which species and amoeba are worthy of love. Almost
everything is excellent, but what does excellence now mean? The necessary comparison class of
the unexcellent has dwindled significantly.
IV. The Problem with Expansion
The stretching of excellence and love described above creates some problems for Finite,
because the superlative status of excellence and love are important practically and to his own
theory’s development. In this section, I highlight some of the inarticulacies and contradictions in
Finite as it stands.
IV.1 Practical vacuity
One of the problems I can now bring to light is that excellence and love have lost their
practical efficacy. Internal to Finite’s theory, when someone tells me a film is excellent, I will
have no idea how to respond. Since both good and bad films are now excellent and contribute to
my wellbeing if I enjoy them, my ability to navigate the world, aside from developing a firm
disposition to enjoy everything, seems now to be imperiled. Of course, we do not reason this
way and Adams can always fall back on taking our commonsense ethical judgments as they
stand. Yet Adams also asserts, contra Parfit, that any theory of morality must meet a publicity
condition.24 I think it would be tenuous to hold publicity essential of moral but not ethical
judgments. Pace Finite’s view on moral judgments, part of what it means to say an act or artifact
falls short of excellence is to say that it should be publicly discouraged from being regarded as
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such. Given that part of publicity is livability among persons, Adams is on the hook for his
theory’s unlivability.
This is a strong statement, but I think it is usually what people mean when they complain
about shallow social tendencies or cultural artifacts. When I say that a popular novel is droll, I
am at least committed to other people not regarding the novel as beautiful. Sometimes I will
hedge my opinion, of course, because I can recognize that my opinion is not entirely developed
or that, for whatever reason, I do not care for novels of that type. Yet, and this is taken as part of
the semantic foundation of Adams’s metaphysics, most such judgments are treated as fact
stating. The difference between the hedged opinion and the firm assertion depends on this
distinction. One side of practical vacuity, then, is that the ontology of these judgments’ truthmakers has exploded.
Another issue with expanding excellence is that expressions and judgments of excellence
and love are inherently comparative. Imagine a world in which excellent art is effortless and
people do not know how to make bad art. All art in this world would, in a sense, be excellent.
For navigation of such a world, the least good would be considered bad and the most good
considered excellent. Everyone’s a Wordsworth, but Wordsworth is tripe. In this world, no
matter what cultural artifact I choose to love, I cannot go far wrong. In another world, truly
excellent art is impossible and people cannot produce good art. Mozart can only make muzak.
In this world, no matter what cultural artifact I choose to love, I cannot go far right. The problem
is that we could never know what world we are in, because our judgments of what is worthy of
love are inherently comparative. Adams is not wrong that all art has a sort of excellence, but his
theory’s generality eclipses the narrow meaning with the broad. In this way, I think his
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semantically-based metaphysics is offending against the practical role expressions of excellence
play.
IV.2 Problems in ethical and moral theory
The same problem in more concrete form arises in Adams’s attempt to prevent the
incorporation of base biological drives, like rest, food, sensory stimulation, and sex, into a
motivational ideal. Because he has already committed himself to the excellence of our
vegetative and animalistic natures, a motivational ideal of love for the good expressed in the
satisfaction of these primitive drives is a sticking point.25 The excellence of the gluttonous sloth
demonstrates the issue of excellence and love’s thinness. A life organized around an ideal of
loved eating, sleeping and masturbating while fulfilling all relevant obligations does not seem
like a very ethical ordering. As a consequence of excellence’s thinness, Adams is reduced to
question begging. The first answer he offers is that they do not express interest in the
comparative excellences of their satisfaction. Unfortunately this makes them no less excellent
and anyway the same could be said of almost any excellence. I desire to read literature, but
there’s no alternative means to its satisfaction besides reading literature. I can read different
types, but then I can sleep on my back or stomach or on a couch or hammock. The second,
longer answer is that they are the same across those who do and do not love the good. But this is
just what is under discussion: what love for the good entails. Adams cannot appeal to the
standard he is in the middle of establishing to delimit that same standard. Worse still, he later
says that honoring these natural aspects can be an important expression of love for the good.
Adams’s ethical scheme, especially idolatry, may be thought to prevent such parody. I
do not think that it does. In the first place, Adams’s concern mentioned above is to prevent such
25
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base natural drives from having ethical weight at all. That goal is unaccomplished, but I am
more concerned to press the larger defect in the ordering of ethical value. Finite’s theory of
agent-based ethics only has real two conditions. One is to form a general disposition to care
about goods and integrate your values by a motivational ideal of caring about goods. The
disposition can be implicit, taken from your valuing particular goods and at least respecting and
liking all goods. The motivational ideal must be “more or less explicit”; you must hold that the
ideal which sculpts your disposition is to care about good, and not bad, things. The other is to
avoid idolatry of any finite good which prevents a person from being ‘in principle’ for the good
generally. Idolatry is indicated by an attachment or misidentification to a finite good which
eclipses your view of goods, in particular as it hinders meeting your obligations. Moreover,
caring about any finite good to the exclusion of others, whether you do your duties or not, leaves
you falling short of the “universal character of true love for the good”.26
These conditions, coupled with excellence’s thinness, either let in the excellent
gluttonous sloth or they require more of persons than is psychologically feasible— there are
weak or strong forms of the conditions. Neither condition in weak form accomplishes much
work on the first horn, because the excellent glutton could explicitly endorse his life as motivated
by goodness and firmly hold that artistic and relational excellences are great, but not be moved
one whit to care about them any more than that. This agent might also meet all of his obligations
and efface a certain detachment from his television and popcorn while critically questioning
whether he ought to be playing video games or sleeping instead. He would thereby have slipped
past Adams’s conditions. The strength of this example is its uncontrivance. People can
earnestly convince themselves that they are living a good life, even explicitly in God’s light,
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while they fritter their lives away gorging on junk food and watching ‘reality’ television.
Moreover, most of them are not, strictly speaking, immoral people— they meet their obligations
and obey all social laws.
Adams’s ethical theory accomplishes too much by the second horn, because the
“universal character of true love for the good” coupled with a world filled with value provides a
bar no one can meet. Adams notes that our limited attentional capacities mean we will have to
care about some goods more than others and that a person can meet his ideal while ignoring
whole ranges of excellence. Yet he also holds that a love for a good is idolatrous if it keeps one
from caring about other instances or types of good. 27 To which we might ask, ‘well, which is
it?’ To keep out the gluttonous sloth, it will have to be the emphasis on love-for-the-good’s
universal character. Further, it will have to be more than a vague ‘in principle’ caring for all
goods, because my counterexample meets that condition. The ‘in principle’ will need to be
enacted by caring, at least enough to recognize their value, all those goods with which one comes
into contact. But in that case, everyone has fallen almost equally short of this standard, for the
experience of a single day is filled to the brim with more excellences than could be appreciated
in many lifetimes. Look around yourself for all the individuated excellences picked out by the
transcendent standard. Does what you see come from nature or is it the product of human
ingenuity? Does it speak of vegetative, animalistic, or humanistic capacities? On this standard,
caring about anything long enough to really appreciate it makes everyone an idolater.
The same issue arises in Finite’s theory of wellbeing. What is good for oneself is even
more apt to repugnant parody than ethical ordering, because it lacks ethical constraints. Bad art
is explicitly in, leaving open what art is at all, so a person can do very well for themselves by
27
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enjoying Nancy Grace and pornography. Doesn’t the technical expertise of at least those
talented persons who direct and produce and edit these cultural artifacts bespeak an excellence in
their product? I think drug and alcohol use are in too. The feeling of drunkenness or ætheric
numbness is testament to the brilliance of humanity’s ingenuity in their creation. Further, the
body’s ability to metabolize this pleasurable poison is an excellent physical capacity as much as
the body’s ability to swim or climb. Through patience and effort, a drunk might work up to
astounding heights of intoxication and accomplish an epic, and distinctly human, feat in driving
home that is the equivalent of an Everest or English Channel.
A theistic view of man’s fallen nature may support either conclusion to the dilemma
posed above. After all, everyone falls short of their ideal and no one cares about all of the goods
around them as they should. No person is innocent of sin. But in that case, is Finite an ethical
theory or a theistic condemnation of ethics? Or perhaps Finite should only be taken as a
metaphysical thesis on value. Of course it is an ethical theory, as can be seen in its taking
substantive positions on controversial ethical views. Further, we can see in its core approach to
excellence, witnessed in III.2, that it looks to root in commonsense examples of exemplary
goodness. The problem of the good’s practical vacuity and the ethical conclusions it generates
only come from stretching excellence too thin. Adams objects to an Aristotelian notion of the
virtuous mean, because he sees extravagant, transcendent virtue witnessed in saints as at least
equally important. He also takes as absurd the idea of getting a bull’s-eye in the messy and
complex ethical decisions of life suggest by complete virtue.28 Alternately, the problem with
applying a transcendent standard to a human ethical ideal is at least as problematic. Either the
target of your actions is so distant and small that the accuracy of your shot is wholly
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indeterminate, or targets surround you near and far such that you can hardly fail to miss if you
develop the needed attitude.
V. Higher-order Values and Affections
Given Finite’s metaphysical theory, I do not think its thin definition of love and
excellence is implausible or unworkable. Adams describes loves widely as “more serious,
engage more of the self [than tastes], and involve attending with care to better and worse ways of
relating to the object.”29 With this expansive notion of love, I think I can agree that all people,
and maybe all values, should be treated with at least this thin form of love. If I do not attend
carefully, at least implicitly, to relate well to every person I meet, I am failing to respect them as
I ought. The theory also makes sense of why some people spend their lives studying things like
broccoli or paper. We might not ordinarily be inclined to call them beautiful or fascinating, but
their depth of value is attested by the fact that some people of apparent virtue should find a
lifetime of rewarding appreciation in them.
So my conclusion from Finite’s problems of practical reason, ethics, and wellbeing
generated by the expansion of excellence argued above is not that its expansion should be
rejected, but that it is deficient in an account of higher-order excellence and love. These would
be those deeper goods and loves which are necessary conditions to a good life or motivational
ideal. By such a condition of necessity, it would limit the burden of idolatry avoidance to a
manageable set of excellences to love. In turn, the weak conditions on ethical ordering and
wellbeing would be strengthened past a motivational ideal of base biological drives to keep out
the slothful glutton as a fitting ideal. The vacuum of practical reason would be likewise filled-in
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by securing the discrimination between higher and lower goods needed for judgments and their
expression.
There are important problems with this general formulation, because the appropriate
criterion could not be ad hoc and would still need to respect the expansion of excellence. That
is, it would need to provide a hermeneutic for how so-called lower goods like broccoli could
become higher goods in a biological or artistic study. Even the worst ‘art’ like ‘reality’
television seems to show a certain degree of excellence when it is the focus of a sociological or
comedic approach. Approaches of this kind are important components of many meaningful,
virtuous lives, so the standard would need to account for their plurality created by this personal,
attitudinal component. The complexity of these approaches alone, understood along the lines of
Rawls’s Aristotelian principle, would not suffice, because mindless sloth can bespeak an
admirable sophistication.
Problems for the proposed supplementation go deeper because higher goods are not just
parasitic on lower goods; lower goods are also parasitic on higher goods. The achievement of
recognizing any excellence as excellent or appreciating anything with the fullness of love is only
accomplished by higher goods. A prime example of this is that a person must have a close,
loving relationship with another person to really know what love is at all. Actually loving
anyone, hence fully appreciating their excellence, even in a thin way, will require such a
relationship. Here, Adams fails to devote sufficient attention to the relation between particulars
and extended particulars. If I really recognize excellence in gourmet meals, it will be because of
extended experience with higher goods like cooking or savoring. In Finite’s terms, some goods
offer a deeper, more fecund glimpse of transcendence.
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This last point leads to two more. The first is that exemplary goods like a loving
relationship are also necessary for any achieved depiction of the transcendent Good, so are
necessary for Finite’s transcendence thesis. That is, knowing God’s nature implicitly or
explicitly requires extended experience with higher goods, so my suggested supplementation will
also be a required epistemological treatment. The ideal of love for the good, to be meaningful or
efficacious, requires it. The second is that the needed criterion would also provide a sufficient
condition (outside of God) for wellbeing and an ethical ideal. Higher goods like a mutually
loving interpersonal relationship are genuine ethical achievements, and themselves order a
person’s values in a deep way. If the love is to be more than an infatuation or obsession, the
“relating better or worse” to the object will involve self-sculpting of one’s values to be worthy of
the relationship. Loving experience with one exemplary good will not suffice for such a selfsculpting, because the conditions of efficacious love require a similar understanding of other
excellences.30 Thus the criterion would provide a rough rule for a web of higher goods loved as
a dynamic whole and in this way be sufficient to avoid idolatry and integrate one’s values.
VI. Conclusion
The supplementary criterion of higher excellences I am suggesting will need to carry a
heavy load to satisfy Finite’s extensive needs. It must mark those more excellent excellences
and loves which provide both the necessary and sufficient conditions of wellbeing and an ethical
ideal. A treatment of necessary goods would then provide a suitable standard of idolatry and
provide needed delimitation of what counts as an ethical and well-lived life. The sufficient
condition would have to be met by roughly defining the dynamic interplay between loves by
which a person comes to a fuller appreciation of necessary excellences. At the same time, it
30
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would need to respect the transcendent standard of excellence by stipulating how lower-order
goods are transformed into higher-order goods and how the discernment and love, however thin,
of lower goods is parasitic on higher goods. The satisfaction of these needs will be taken up in
chapter III.
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CHAPTER II
PROBLEMS IN TALBOT BREWER’S THE RETRIEVAL OF ETHICS
I. Introduction
The Retrieval of Ethics argues a radical theory of dynamic practical reason and
epistemology to support its theory of ethics in the good life as pleasant absorption in unimpeded
activity. Brewer sees the need for radical revision in the diverse array of assumptions in theories
of philosophical psychology and ethics which are wholly foreign to Aristotelian virtues and
thereby block their application. I will attempt to focus on its unique theories of epistemology-aspractical-reason and the good. My goal in this chapter is to construct an interpretation of
Retrieval which announces its radicalism and the deficiencies which this radicalism generates.
After an extremely rough sketch of Retrieval’s theory as whole, I will focus on the essential
thesis of its philosophical psychology. My assertion is that this thesis is best understood as the
primacy of the practical perspective and that the epistemology it generates is both attractive and
deeply problematic. My conclusion is that Retrieval is deficient in a treatment of objectivity and
that its psychology of practical reason calls for abatement.
II. Summary
Retrieval’s ethical theory is predicated on a metaethical theory of practical reason and the
self. The aim is to, by a theory of moral psychology, build normativity into a theory of practical
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reason. Retrieval offers a theory of the self as equally doer and experiencer in which what is
experienced both structures practical reasoning and is structured by practical reasons. The self’s
evaluative outlook inescapably structures its experience and its experience structures how it will
reason to act. This is where his metaethical theory arrives: the perspective of practical reason
depends on the objective, external, irreducible, and monistc nature of goods. These are the
goods which our evaluative outlooks track and by which we constantly sculpt our evaluative
understanding through considered judgments and thereby the actions which surge forth from this
understanding. Because a person’s evaluative outlook structures the ethically salient features of
his circumstances and thereby structures his ethical actions, the achievement of a subtle and selfaffirmable evaluative understanding is a person’s central ethical achievement. To the extent that
a person brings her evaluative seemings (desires and pleasures) into accord with their considered
evaluative judgments (reasoning) so that her actions are generally harmonious and pleasant, to
that extent the person is a fully formed and autonomous self.
The metaethical and ethical theories turn largely on the importance of dialectical
activities and evaluative outlooks. Activities as diverse as baseball, parenting, mathematics,
philosophy, chess, and cooking can be considered dialectical. Dialectical activities are those
complex and typically rewarding activities in which a running sense of, and appreciative
absorption in, their value and constitutive standards are essential to participation. They also offer
ever more depth of discernment of their value and how best to act on this value through further
experience with the activities— engagement in the activity provides a dialectic of improved
appreciation and participation. It is essential to full appreciation and participation in dialectical
activities that they be undertaken and valued for their own sake, because instrumental valuing
robs them of completion as pleasurable.
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At the substantive level, dialectical activities fit our intuitions of intrinsically valuable
activities, are represented in our relationships and structured lives, are our primary and most
fecund source of pleasure, and defy the frame of productionism. They are the sorts of activities
which people devote their lives to and by which almost all people structure their lives. As
regards Brewer’s ethical theory, they demonstrate by these properties the plausibility of defining
the good life as one constituted by unimpeded activity.31 Their dependence and sculpture of
achieved evaluative understanding and the importance of achieved evaluative understanding to
ethical action makes them important sources of ethical value. The virtues become important to
the dialectical theory of the good life not as mere moralism or appeal to intuition, but as essential
components of the firm evaluative outlook which make dialectical activities possible. In the
ideal case the virtues make possible success in the highest dialectical activity of ordering
subsidiary activities in a happy and full life.
Goods are external because we do not judge our desires to be tracking themselves, but
what is desirable in the world. Goods are objective because we evaluate our desires for goods to
discern whether they are real goods such that our actions will not be arbitrary or disastrous. I
have a desire to be happy, there is heroin in front of me, and perhaps I desire the heroin to the
end of becoming happy. I contemplate and check my desire because I understand that shooting
up would not be good. I realize it is objectively bad because I would not judge anyone in my
situation to be doing something good, for themselves or otherwise. I would instead say they
judged incorrectly in mistaking a counterfeit good to be a real good.
Goods are irreducible because the appropriateness of responses to goods and bads in the
world is acutely particularized such that a reduction to reasons-for or natural properties only
31
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obscures rather than clarifies this particularity. Reduction to reasons-for endlessly postpones an
explanation of apt responses’ particularity, because the appropriate response was caused by the
reasons for the appropriate response which was the appropriate response caused by the reasons
for, etc. The paradox lies in the fact that when we reason practically we do not reason from
reason for response but to reasons for response. Naturalistic reductions will not work because
they violate the ontological scruples which are their impetus. If goodness is a non-natural
property occasioned by natural properties, as e.g. Moore held, then there are normative nonnatural reasons to posit goodness of certain natural properties. The naturalistic reductivist “must
see purely natural facts as something other than purely natural facts in order to see reasons
aright… the problem is that if natural facts are reasons, their status as reasons seems to be
something strictly additional to their status as natural facts.”32
The dualistic view of goods, inherited from Sidgwick and largely assumed among
modern perspectives, is that moral value and personal happiness are distinct pursuits.33 Brewer
rejects dualism in favor of a similar rejection he sees in Plato and Aristotle. The good is
monistic (just meaning non-dualistic) because the self as a continuous practical reasoner is
constituted by its coherence and continuity of pursuits, which must be guided by an equivalently
coherent and continuous pursuit of goods. A person is only an agent to the extent that she
reasons from a monistic conception of the good, because otherwise her autonomy dissolves into
the incoherent and discontinuous pursuit of competing desires after competing goods. Thus a
person who does not possess a minimal threshold of impersonally good virtue cannot be
attributed personal goods because he is so internally conflicted that he cannot be said to have a
self to which we might attribute goods. Moral good is thus not a distinct type of good: it is part
32
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of the monistic good because the value of morality depends on value generally (e.g. people, art,
relationships).
This theory of the good is related to the virtues and to the ethical values of decisions and
actions through a theory of action which is almost entirely based in evaluation. Virtues are
essential for the clarity they give by way of avoidance of counterfeit seemings of goodness.
Attainment of the ideal human life is activity towards the highest good of understanding the
goods in all of one’s activities and ordering them appropriately. Completion of this highest good
requires appreciative, pleasurable absorption in those activities and a certain amount of good
luck to avoid tragedies like war and famine which might make one’s life go badly. It also
requires character friendships, valued intrinsically, with other pursuers after virtue, beginning
with a decent upbringing. These character friendships are the dialectic mechanism of shared
evaluative outlooks, evaluative outlooks which monisticaly track goods, and evaluative
understandings which can order the life-dialectic and the soul.
III. Methodological Interpretation
In this section I dig deeper into Brewer’s theory of practical reason and argue that it is
more radical than Brewer realizes. I expound on three features which suggest a radical
psychological theory: evaluative inescapability, destruction of the practical/theoretical divide,
and a phenomenology of practical primacy. Together these features yield a thesis of the
primacy of the practical perspective or what I will alternately call practical primacy or the
principle of practical primacy. This is a psychological thesis which couches epistemology in a
perspectival theory or practical reason, and hence in the perspective of the practical reasoner.
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III.1 First feature: Evaluative Inescapability
The constant fundamentality of evaluative outlooks is the most basic point on which the
other two hang. As mentioned above, Retrieval’s ethical theory is founded on the achievement
of an evaluative outlook which tracks the objective normative features of one’s circumstances.
The achieved evaluative outlook is also partly constituted by a pre-reflective and protoevaluative outlook which structures one’s experiences and characteristic judgments. These
structuring features are the emotions, desires, and pleasures.34 Evaluative reflection on prereflective/reflective cohesion and whether one’s desires, pleasures and emotions are felicitous in
tracking and acting on goods, can reshape their structure.35

Yet evaluative reflection and the

considered judgments which might initiate reflection are in turn dependent on the more primary
evaluative outlook.
Evaluative inescapability runs deep as a product of Brewer’s rejection of the description/
evaluation divide36 which is in turn a product of rejecting the belief/desire divide37 and the
division of pre-deliberative/post-deliberative stages of practical reason.38 It is not merely that
evaluations are essential to experience such that evaluative judgments always follow experience,
but that a person’s evaluative judgments are built into experience itself. In this way, the objects
and relations of the world are experienced with the marks of practical reason as pre-judgment
features of one’s circumstances. This opens up the primacy of the practical perspective (I’ll call
this ‘practical primacy’) because any experience will contain the structure of practical reason.
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Since experience is to be regarded as inherently practical, it will always be fit to the practical
reasoner’s perspective.
III.2 Second feature: destruction of the practical/theoretical division
The destruction of the practical/theoretical division begins in the demonstration that
practical and theoretical reason are so intertwined that there is no objective and purely theoretical
perspective from which to doubt the reality of practical reasons. This point goes deeper than the
common realist assertion that metaphysical and epistemological theories rely on normative
components. An anti-realist might allow that uncontroversial normativity, e.g. of the kind that
generates near-unanimous consensus among scientists, is needed to reach the objectivity of
ethical anti-realism. She might then hold that the normative standard which produces antirealism is markedly less subjective and controversial than ethical or aesthetic normativity.
Brewer’s theory defies this anti-realism because it not only builds the perspective of practical
reason into our experience of the world, which might allow theoretical abstraction. It also builds
the perspective of practical reason into the contours of theoretical reason itself. Indeed,
dialectical activities display the fluency between practical and theoretical reason because our
actions in dialectical activities are continually guided by an evolving understanding of the
activity and our circumstances. The way the world appears and how we act in it are
fundamentally connected; theoretical reason is itself sculpted by practical reason.
It might be objected, however, that the fusion of practical and theoretical reason is only
present in rare cases of dialectical absorption. The answer to this objection will turn on an
expansion of practical/theoretical fluency to all reasoning. First, this objection fails because
while dialectical activities play a special role in shaping experience of practical reason, practical
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reasoning never ceases because the evaluative outlook is inescapable. Second, it fails because
our lives are inescapable dialectical activities, which means that any action or reasoning may be
considered as a non-atomistic part of a dialectical whole. This lends the further thought that
there are no deep differences between activities and actions or activity and reason. An action is
always a practical activity. A bout of reasoning is always an (mental) action. Third, it fails
because theoretical reasoning of the most celebrated and perspicacious type is itself a
paradigmatic dialectical activity. Theoretical reasoning is always shaped in its contours and
progressions by the internalized evaluative norms which are constitutive of its type.39 By
example, the mathematician does not become aware of lines of thought or avenues of
progression and then judge them to be worth consideration. This would be a weaker claim of
normativity’s requirement. Rather, what lines of thought are open for consideration or feel
promising will be structured by her achieved evaluative understanding of mathematics.
There is neither purely theoretic experience of the world for reason to theorize from, nor
purely theoretical reasoning which might abstract from the practical structure of experience.
Brewer consistently describes practical and theoretical reason as intertwined, but if my
interpretation is correct then he is downplaying his position— practical and theoretical reason are
dual aspects of a single faculty. Practical primacy gains support from this feature because the
perspective of practical reason not only permeates the external world of experience, but the
internal world of thought and reason.
III.3 Third feature: the phenomenology of practical primacy

39

Ibid., p309

29

The arguments above suffice to establish practical primacy as the best characterization of
Brewer’s moral psychology. This characterization also illuminates Retrieval’s reliance on the
phenomenology of the practical perspective. Appeals to phenomenology back up both
evaluative inescapability and the theoretical/practical union. Evaluative inescapability as a thesis
of the practical shape of experience finds credibility in the phenomenal commonality of
experiences which initiate automatic actions. When I take a step into a crosswalk and see a
speeding truck closing in on where I will shortly be, the experience of ‘get back’ is
phenomenally indistinguishable from ‘speeding truck’.
Evaluative inescapability is observable in the tendency of practices and activities to
spread this phenomenal fusion of practical and theoretical features. A seasoned and lifelong
practitioner or connoisseur of nearly anything finds that their prior activities sculpt their
experience generally.40 A seasoned libertarian does not have to be in ‘libertarian mode’ to see
any experience with government as tyrannical or any shortcoming in society as the cause of
regulation. The experiences show up with these features attached. The phenomenological
backing of practical reasons in theoretical reasoning takes a similar form. Certain lines of
thought will appear, while possible others, most of which would be faulty, will not. Further, the
promising lines will feel promising and those which promise revelatory connections or a true and
nascent originality will feel particularly exciting or captivating.
The phenomenology of practical primacy is also appealed to in Brewer’s account of
dialectical activities41 and his argument for appreciative attention in loving desires.42 It is the

40

A seasoned herbologist does not have to be in ‘herbology mode’ to see an esoteric spice at an open air market as a
welcome addition to her stock or the hippies complaining of muscle aches a tent over as gullible consumers of this
same spice.
41
Ibid., p39, 47
42
Ibid., p63

30

foundation of Retrieval’s theory of attentional pleasure in activity and passivity43 which
demonstrates the necessity of valuing one’s doings and the ethical significance of pruning
desires. Phenomenological expositions also establish the particularity of values, the value of
persons, the danger of evaluative numbness, and the connection between particularized attitudes
and value realism.44 The phenomenology of the practical perspective completes the picture of
practical primacy as the characteristic stance of Brewer’s perspectival theory of practical reason.
Practical primacy’s pride of place is demonstrated throughout Retrieval in its rejections
of deflationary views as “reflectively untenable from the perspective of practical reason.” It is
the basis for Brewer’s denials of generalism, anti-realism, subjectivism, internalism, and
reductivism. As such, it is the backbone of his value realism and his substantive ethical system
which relies on a peculiar and realistic view of goodness that might be otherwise implausible.
As a psychological thesis, practical primacy possesses a radicalism which is difficult to
exaggerate. It illicits a subjective theory of epistemology that provides an integration of value
and opens up an extensive phenomenology of ethical action and thought. It simultaneously
guarantees the objectivity of this integrative phenomenology. The firm base of its
epistemological weight is the elimination of the description/evaluation divide, which I think has
a decidedly greater area of effect than any rejection of the fact/value divide. Whether this
radicalism proves untenable or untamable is taken up below.
III.4 Practical primacy’s problem of narrativity
Brewer appeals to a theory of the self as a narrative entity in numerous and important
arguments throughout Retrieval. The importance and objectivity of continuity and narrativity is
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predicated on Brewer’s notion of practical primacy, but it is also a distinctly contested feature of
the first personal perspective in wider philosophical discussion. As such, a perusal of temporal
continuity and narrativity’s place in Retrieval along with detractors of narrativity will begin to
illuminate the shortcomings of practical primacy.
Brewer’s argument for the dialectical life leans heavily on the importance of narrative
continuity; “The self that pursues an understanding of its own guiding concerns will generally
find that these concerns take on a more finely articulated shape as pursuit advances.”45 This is a
solid statement of the relation between dialectical desires and dialectical activities considered
from the first-personal perspective over a whole life. Appeal to narrative continuity is also one
of the principal arguments for Brewer’s theory of dialectical activities and desires. Dialectical
desires, and the dialectical activities of which they are a part, can change their form and generate
massively disparate actions. Instrumental and calculative theories of action cannot make good
sense of this continuity because “what seems from the first-personal standpoint… to be growth is
reduced to mere change.”46 Alternately, what is experienced first-personally or interpreted by a
“sympathetic biographer” as “greater clarity, depth, or excellence” is reduced to “a series of
unrelated shifts in one’s behavior.”47
Practical thinking is analogous to the author’s task of completing his unfinished book’s
narrative.48 Narrative activities are those which bring our lives into a unity in the present and
support our intuitions of fortunate and unfortunate lives and deaths.49 We also rely on narratives
in others’ lives to interpret and discern the value and place of our own life projects and to give
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substance to our obligations based on a shared narrative.50 The common thread among these
assertions is their alleged derivation from the primacy of the practical perspective. Narrativity is
offered as an essential feature of first-personal practical experience for which a theory of action
must account to avoid violation of practical primacy.
What, though, of those practical reasoners who feel no sense of narrativity or continuity
in their lives? Galend Strawson attests to feel no sense of narrativity and very little of continuity
in his life.51 What is more, he has scoured for non-narratives among historical artists and
philosophers and finds similar sentiments among Michel de Montaigne, Henry James, the Earl of
Shaftesbury, Bob Dylan, Geronwy Rees, and Sartre. Dan Dennett claims to support narratively
structuring lives as common and distinctly human, but also finds that of course they are
obviously fictions.52
These first-personal appeals against narrativity are particularly troublesome for Brewer
because they arise out of the same perspective from which he appeals for narrativity. Brewer’s
theory rests serious weight on narrative continuity to argue his theory of dialectical activity. If
Strawson and Dennett’s views hold water then this essential feature of Brewer’s ethics is in
trouble, because the practical perspective could then be turned upon by what Strawson calls
‘Episodics’ to refute the specialness of dialectical activities. Of particular relevance is that these
views cast doubts on practical primacy because they illustrate our human flair for arbitrariness
and the imposition of importance. In so illustrating, they show a worry of vacuity in appeals to
‘the perspective of practical reason’ or ‘the first-personal perspective’ because it is the nature of
these perspectives that there be no ‘the’ but only ‘a’ or ‘many’.
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There is also the danger that practical primacy yields a multitude of realisms that it would
be better not to yield. Almost no one’s life is particularly narrative in its whole or even simply
through its important parts, because few people possess the sense of purpose or aptitude for
continual self-improvement which is a hallmark of the dialectical life. Alternately, practical
primacy may authorize a system of narratives which are nearly entirely false and which roundly
contradict each other. Episodes of ‘reality television’ usually derive from hundreds of hours of
tape showing no narrative to a passably narrative forty minutes of heavily chopped and edited
video. Brewer’s narrative exemplar in St. Augustine as a medieval Newt Gingrich does not
quash these issues but only magnifies them. These problems with narrativity point to a larger
problem of subjectivism in practical primacy to which I now turn.
IV. Practical Idealism and Transcendence
In this section the interpretive thrust begun above is furthered by drawing out the
implications of practical primacy in a fully formed normative epistemology I call ‘practical
idealism’. Brewer’s theory is best understood as practical idealism because it shares
informatively analogous features and problems with transcendental idealism. A cursory
development of practical idealism leads quickly to a need for supplementation with a
transcendental good and associated issues.
IV.1 Practical idealism and transcendental good
The stated thrust of argumentation at several and unrelated points in Retrieval is to
dispute what is called the “Kantian picture” of practical reason as it has shaped both Kantian and
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non-Kantian interpretations of the structure of practical reason.53 The Kantian view separates
practical and theoretical reason into temporally and conceptually distinct episodes of thought.
One important aspect of the Kantian picture of practical reason is its relation to the Kantian
picture of theoretical reason, i.e. transcendental idealism. By rejection of the Kantian picture of
practical reason, Brewer also rejects the Kantian picture of epistemology. Transcendental
idealism (on the canonical interpretation as epistemological) shares certain interesting
methodological similarities with Brewer’s epistemology despite its being an abjectly different
approach. Both theories turn on psychological theses, employ principles of significance derived
from psychology, posit proto-cognitive structural features of human experience, assert an
objective and abiding structure of experience, and aim to limit the pretensions of theories which
violate the condition of this structure.
In light of their similarities, I suggest that the theory Brewer establishes in transcendental
idealism’s place is best understood as practical idealism. Practical idealism is an apt title for
Brewer’s normative epistemology because of the most important shared feature with
transcendental idealism: both deny access to the world-as-it-is-in-itself while also securing the
objectivity and reality of this world. On practical idealism’s formulation, this is the view that the
experiencer’s experience is shaped by her developed practical outlook such that purely theoretic
experience of the world is impossible. Practical idealism treats the problem of access to the
world of value as distinct from experience by its own discursivity thesis: experience and reason
are discursive of the reality and objectivity of value. This discursivity just is the thesis of
practical primacy. Negatively, it is the claim that a philosophical position grounded in
experience is not being accurate of that experience if it does not include its practical contours.
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Its recurrent transcendental-style arguments begin from the core supposition of practical
primacy— that our experience and reason are essentially practical. Then, those skeptical or
reductive theories of the good are shown to violate key features of the good that are necessary
conditions of practical reason. Since the good is found necessary for experience and reason, it
cannot be intelligibly considered as unreal, internal, or subjective. Such considerations founder
by contradiction of the perspective from which they arise. Thus, reductive or subjective theories
of value are practically transcendent because they violate practical primacy. The good,
understood in abstraction as the class of all particular goods or practical reasons, is the
transcendental object of practical idealism. Its reality, objectivity, and externality are not secured
by practical primacy per se, but by the impossibility (which follows from practical primacy) of
thinking otherwise.
But the individual’s experience of the good is itself subjectively value-laden because
affected by his own personal and unique evaluative scheme. In addition, Brewer’s standard of
objectivity in evaluative outlooks on the world is structured along coherentist lines as constituted
by self-affirmability and a self-consistent conceptual scheme. Coherentism compounds the
problem by the typical objection that coherence does not yield correspondence, in this case to the
good. This line of thought quickly leads to the concern, broached in the previous section, that
practical primacy generates the specter of subjectivism for practical idealism. Epistemic
subjectivism, understood from the perspective of practical reason, is the worry that key features
of agents’ ethical lives which rely on the fundamental sharedness of the experience of value are
foregone. One is autonomy, because it relies on the monistically coherent and largely correct
identification of the good. Others are the recognition of value of persons and, relatedly, shared
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activities and communication, because they rely on trust that others’ share “an experience of the
world that runs deep”.54
The issue here turns on Brewer’s view that practical reasons not only structure experience
and so structure the material by which theoretical and practical reason work, but are also the
product of individuals’ particular experiences and activities. The practical contours of current
experience are heavily influenced by the experiencer’s previous experiences. This is shown in
the phenomenological distinctness of a single experience among a variety of persons with
distinct practical backgrounds. When we consider our experiences “what we will find… are a
series of apprehensions that already bear the marks of our practical concerns” and since our
practical concerns fill the world and are shaped by our practices, our experiences are
irreconcilably distinct. On this point Brewer gives the example of the sound of a motorized saw
operated by a carpenter as experienced by carpenter, mechanic and sound artist.55 The prereflective outlooks of the carpenter whose experience of the sound automatically guides her
motions, the mechanic whose experience indicates worn bearings, and the artist whose
experience indicates incorporation into an ongoing composition, all shape their various
experiences.56
From the above described situation, I think a thicker role of the transcendental good can
now be seen. It must secure the objectivity of practical reason through grounding these various
perspectives in a maximally shared practical structure. The problem is obviously that it is the
nature of practical primacy that each should not be able to experience the practical contours of
54
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the others. The mechanic is likely to guffaw at the sound artist’s claim to hear beauty in a buzz
saw. In the mundane occurrence described above, not much is lost by this incommensurability.
Yet, when such an event is one of the frequent high-stakes ethical occurrences involving two
people of widely different experiential backgrounds, the problems of communication and
understanding can be quite grave. To begin the answer to this problem, I think that practical
idealism only requires objectivity defined as maximal intersubjectivity between practical
reasoners. Why should intersubjectivity be the standard? First, because it is the only standard of
objectivity open to practical idealism, because practical primacy establishes as many experienced
realities as there are practical reasoners. Second, because by practical primacy, if this is the only
standard of objectivity open to practical idealism and it is necessary for practical reason, then
there is no other intelligible form of objectivity.
Given objectivity-as-intersubjectivity, still, this just delays the answer to the worry of
subjectivism. For, what is this transcendental good such that it would secure intersubjectivity
among practical reasoners? The standards this good must meet become even more stringent
when the characteristics of the good’s role in Retrieval are considered. The good is asserted to
be fundamentally mysterious and ineffable at the first order perspective— it transcends capture
or full articulation.57 Yet its mystery goes deeper, because on Retrieval’s fluid theory of
practical reason an agent engaged in dialectical activity is primarily attentive to the “nature and
point of what [she] is doing” and not her circumstances.58 This is because it is not just that goods
must be external, but that they are only discernible internally to the activity.59 Dialectical
activities drive Brewer’s theory of practical reason because to be the temporally extended actions
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we take them to be, the internal good which drives our participation by a continually refined
appreciation must be already wholly present. We struggle for a good already intimated, but
imperfectly realized. The blues singer who struggles to perfect her performance of a song
struggles, on Brewer’s theory, to understand and bring about a good (the performance she is
attempting) which is already the basis of her activity.60 The good is externally real but only
discernible internally and also both wholly present and non-actualized.
The role of the transcendental good must also be the underpinning of goods found by
practical reason to be both plural and monistic. Plural because there are a wide array of goods
internal to different dialectical activities and to the infinite variety of orderings which might
constitute a good life which is distinctly one’s own. Monistic because there is no deep
distinction between personal and impersonal goods, and because the goods pursued in dialectical
activities share a commonality in constituting dialectical activities. The good as plural and
monistic further suggests that the transcendental good must ground an ordering relation among
practical goods. There must be this ordering relation in Retrieval because the value of dialectical
activities (which Brewer sees as representing our most valuable and personal doings) is
constituted by both internal experience and their place in ordering a good human life.61 Because
this ordering is itself the unshirkable dialectical activity of a lived life and so must have its own
constitutive good that drives the ordering; there must be a highest good by which the values of
the others are ordered. That is, the transcendental good must also secure the objectivity of the
eudaimon life.
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A further constraint on this transcendental good is that it cannot be metaphysical or part
of a supersensible reality, as Kant’s transcendental object is canonically taken to be. This is
because Retrieval requires of the good that it be real by its practical efficacy, not a “bald
intuition” of the good’s ontological reality.62 Practical primacy reveals value’s “non-absurd
realism” by its necessary place to understand “the nature and point of human life” as we live it.
Because philosophy is a valuable activity internal to the lived life, it has no external base from
which to curtail the fundamental needs of human moral psychology. So, the transcendental good
must be conceived as a fit object by which to reason practically. The solution can, once again,
be understood by analogy to transcendental idealism, but this time from a non-canonical
perspective. Henry Allison has argued persuasively (to my mind) that the transcendental object,
to escape the problem of Jacobian affectation, be conceived as a purely epistemic thesis.63 Along
the same lines, the transcendental good would offer a common epistemic structuring of practical
reason to which practical reasoners might appeal.
V. Retrieval’s mechanisms of securing objectivity
In a way, the concern of subjectivism I am pressing is just the other side of Brewer’s
particularist ethical view in its collapse of the distinction between epistemology and value
theory. Though my own interpretation of Retrieval endeavors to illuminate the problem from an
interpretive perspective, it is certainly anticipated by Brewer. His mechanisms for securing
evaluative objectivity among persons given the particularity of ethical judgments are three:
character friendship, thick evaluative concepts, and the virtues. The character virtues are
epistemically important for the evaluative clarity they offer. Here I will consider just character
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friendship and thick evaluative concepts, as the virtue and vice terms are themselves part of the
set of thick evaluative concepts. I argue in this section that they are ultimately insufficient to
dispel the shadow of subjectivism.
V.1 Morality in character friendships
The right’s treatment in Retrieval is dependent on a social theory that involves character
friendship and a background stock of virtues and thick evaluative concepts.64 In Retrieval,
character friendship is a necessary component to a mature and subtle evaluative outlook.
Character friendships act as the mechanism by which we hone our evaluative clarity in an effort
to track objective goods. At the same time that it makes possible the ordering of the good life,
there is a sense in which it is able to do so by its intrinsic and transcendental value.
Transcendental, because in its importance and moral capacity it might be considered the orderer
of all value and that for which the individual orders his dialectics.
We must value the friendship for its own intrinsic value to reap the benefits of virtue and
the expansion of our evaluative outlook which produces intersubjective self-affirmability and
approaches universal self-affirmability in the ideal case.65 This is the introduction of specifically
moral content into Retrieval’s ethical system, because when coupled with monism, good
character friendships yield a telos of evaluative outlooks that can affirm their view of the good
across a full range of instantiations in others. Since to evaluate an action as good is to possess a
reason for performing it, ethical actions are not universalizable but instead spring from a
universalizable evaluative outlook. The particularism of evaluations and universalism of
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morality are united; the intersubjectivity of evaluative outlooks among distinct reasoners is
secured.
V.2 Why character friendship fails
The tests of intersubjective and universal self-affirmability go astray as attempts to
introduce intersubjectivity or moral reasoning into Retrieval’s evaluation-based ethnics.
Universal self-affirmability fails because it violates the practical scruples which motivate the
particularist stance. The universally self-affirmable outlook is an impossibility no matter how
ideally a character friendship proceeds. It requires an agent to affirm his own outlook across all
counterfactual instantiations in any agent.66 The blacksmith who attains such a state must be
able to affirm his evaluations in a President negotiating at Camp David, an astronaut repairing a
space station, or a mother dealing with the complicated task of bartering her children. We
simply do not have access to such a possibility of considerations for the same reason ethics is
uncodifiable as an endeavor of generalization: people do not have the mental capacity or
experiential content to arrive at such broad conclusions. Thick evaluative terms are not a merely
useful hermeneutic. They are an essential feature of a confusing and intricate world of messy
ethical decisions which we often second-guess in hindsight.
Intersubjective self-affirmability seems like it might do better, but fails because character
friendship can too easily become an echo chamber of vicious outlooks. Character friendships
are, after all, how so many of the most pernicious and deep seated prejudices and flaws of
evaluative understanding remain present in our ethical community. Those with common
evaluative understandings tend to group and reinforce, finding character friendship more natural.
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This is particularly the case when they feel their evaluative understandings to be socially
diminished or even conspired against. The phenomenon is often ethically innocuous or even
valuable in the formation of most subcultures around shared deviances and stigmas which are
themselves ill-founded. An enthusiasm for steampunk or death metal are hardly distortions of
the kind I mean and are likely valuable to the broader culture in broadening its evaluative clarity
and providing a hub of strong character friendship.
The serious problem for Brewer’s view is the formation of religious and secular
subcultures around grossly distorted values such as protesting the funerals of gay veterans or
plotting against the illusory threat of a global Zionist conspiracy. More influential and pervasive
than these are mainstream evaluative prejudices against races, sexualities, classes, etc. Racists
and sexists can find intersubjective self-affirmability in one another without problem. Across
indexicals, they can wholeheartedly affirm that were they a certain race or sex, or possessed the
characteristics they see in another demographic, they would be objectively lesser.67 Or worse, a
subjugated group can internalize a standard of inferiority that they feel is true and come to
intersubjectively affirm their self-abasement. What this shows is that grounding correctness or
sharedness of evaluative understanding in character friendship is necessary but insufficiently
strong.
Evaluations cannot come close to an objective standard of the world or value by character
friendship considered in isolation, because as regards these shared evaluative blind spots it is as
likely to reinforce vicious outlooks on the world and the good as virtuous ones. To put the point
epistemically, it is as likely to encourage a skewed structure of experience as a balanced, truth-
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tracking one. An atomistic theory of character friendship simply cannot secure objectivity of
experience or practical evaluation, because the sound artist and carpenter could become the
closest of friends yet experience the same sounds as wholly different. The subjectivity of
experience poses particular problems for shared accounts of ethical events between two strangers
who have disparate character friendships. Atomistic character friendships simply cannot secure
the sharedness and maximal intersubjectivity of experience for the same reason they cannot
secure morality.
V.3 Thick Evaluative Concepts
Thick evaluative concepts are important tools to guide our evaluative judgments as we
discern and act in a world infused with normativity. They are concepts that defy the
evaluative/descriptive divide like: tactful, courageous, cruel, bold, lazy, selfish, and vain. The
sorting of thick evaluative concepts is, aside from character friendship, Brewer’s other major
effort to head off this worry of practical subjectivism. Thick evaluative concepts are essential to
Brewer’s theory because they backup his particularism in acting as universals of particularized
application and correspond with the virtues and vices. Thick evaluative concepts also have a
social aspect in being culturally received from one’s linguistic community and in Brewer’s test
of decomposition by socio-historical considerations. Brewer suggests a test of decomposition
into descriptive and evaluative components which genuine thick evaluative concepts resist. The
nature of the test is to consider the thick evaluative concept’s socio-historical background such
that its decomposition can be accounted for by its generation in a historically unjust evaluative
outlook. By example, the ladylike can be decomposed by accounting for its tendency to “bolster
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a dominant social role for males, flatter the male ego, and gratify male sexual fantasies.”68 It
purports to track a genuine evaluative property which is in fact non-evaluative.
There are at least two problems with this test as it stands. The first is that we can
reasonably turn a cynical eye on most thick evaluative concepts considered in isolation, because
of the historical tendency towards their corruption to exploit human moral psychology. We
might consider the courageous as an evaluative concept which puts an unjust thumb on the scales
when a community is deliberating on war or that it has been historically employed by the old and
the powerful to deceive passionate youths into killing each other. The generous or charitable
might be debunked by the Nietzschean claim that they are inventions of the weak to enslave the
strong. Even the most straightforward cases like the honest could be regarded as a tool of
powerful and dishonest aristocrats to keep out competition from the lower classes by inculcating
self-defeating values.
The second is that the self-aware perspective of those groups of people who are wrongly
maligned by false evaluative concepts will be the basis of their correction. An individual’s
efforts to sort concepts in isolation or with a friend has not been the historical driver of
evaluative progress. Taking Brewer’s examples of the uppity or the ladylike, these terms would
enjoy significantly more cultural currency today without the women’s and civil rights
movements. The brunt of the corrective process of the most misguided thick evaluative concepts
is achieved through social awareness. Often their revision is expressed in the cultural artifacts,
like music and literature, of groups which are unfairly maligned.69 The sorting of thick
evaluative concepts is not enough on its own to secure intersubjectivity, because it is the
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recognition of another, or one’s own, group’s mistreatment by the concept that is the crucial step.
It is such a recognition which is at stake in the problem of intersubjectivity.
VI. Conclusion
The problem with practical primacy began in the aptness of narrative life-structure to
gross distortions indicating subjective, constructed imposition. Concerns of subjectivity gained
full expression in my interpretation of Retrieval as based on a theory of practical idealism and
the problem of shared experience. The cause of concern is that practical idealism seems to
generate a paradox between: (1) what the first-personal practical perspective demands by
practical primacy for sharedness of value and experience (e.g. shared activities, character
friendship, evaluative concept sorting, and recognition of human value) and (2) the experiential
and subjective structure of that same perspective created by practical primacy (especially the
dialectical shaping of practical reason, the destruction of theoretical/practical divide, and their
combination in the practical structure of experience). Though atomistic character friendship and
thick evaluative concepts offer what can be accepted as necessary conditions for objectivity, they
were found insufficient on their own.
Their consideration does, however, contribute a certain character to the problem of
intersubjectivity. The problem is that practical idealism seems to occlude truly shared
experiences, meaningful communication, and character friendship between two people with a
disparate evaluative outlook generated by their distinct practical experiences. Indeed, even
though they share a common culture and live eudaimonistic lives. A shared source of evaluative
outlooks on the good in thick evaluative concepts would need to be the epistemic feature of the
transcendental good discussed in section IV. The transcendental good would open up, at the
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least, the possibility of shared views and communication on the ordering of thick evaluative
concepts and character friendship. That is, it will need to somehow incorporate the particularist
mechanisms of thick evaluative concepts and character friendships into its structure.
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CHAPTER III
ADAMS AND BREWER REPAIR EACH OTHER
I. Introduction
The two previous sections depicted two distinct approaches to ethics with distinct
problems. In this section, I will argue a compelling complementation between the two views—
that each might correct the deficiency I have urged in the other. Brewer’s largely Aristotelian
theory of the good life in dialectical activities and character friendships solves Adams’s need for
a criterion of higher goods. Adams’s loosely Platonic theory of the transcendent Good and its
relational ordering of value solve Brewer’s need for a shared source of value among practical
reasoners. The shape of this section, then, will be a narrow synthesis of the two views. I call it a
narrow synthesis because while I think they line up along the dimensions I discuss, I will not
argue any wide-ranging synthesis of interlocking positions in the two theories. The burden of
my proposed synthesis is much lighter than that. All I aim to accomplish here is the
demonstration that the weaknesses I have pointed to in each theory can be largely remedied by
features of the other.
I begin this synthesis by demonstration of Brewer’s account of dialectical activities as a
necessary and sufficient criterion for Adams’s ethical theory. I then turn to Brewer’s theory,
beginning with an interpretation of the thinly transcendent good as already present and the
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possibility that Adams’s thick transcendence would offer the needed element of objectivity.
From there, I develop a sketch of a social and epistemic transformation of transcendence from
God to community. I conclude the section by way of a synthesized view of morality taken from
the practical perspective’s incorporation of the community.
II. A dialectical standard for Finite
In this subsection, I argue the fitness of Brewer’s theory of dialectical activities as
Finite’s needed criterion of higher-order excellences.
II.1 A statement of the problem and the character of dialectical activities
At the end of section A, I offered a very general formulation of the criterion of higher
excellences Finite requires to resolve the problems generated by its expansion of excellence. I
stated there that the criterion of higher goods would need to meet some strict guidelines to offer
the support Finite needs while also respecting Finite’s larger theoretical aims. The three main
problems with Finite that the criterion needs to solve are practical vacuity, the indeterminacy of
its ethical theory, and an unsavory looseness in its theory of wellbeing. My proposal must meet
a standard of necessary features of those higher-order excellences that can constrain the needs of
practical judgments and expression, the formation of an integrative ethical ideal and the goods
which contribute to wellbeing. It must also account for what are intuitively considered goods
improper to love, like bacteria or a chair, could become higher goods, worthy of love, by certain
approaches or attitudes. As well, I stated that the standard would need to give an account of the
achievement of coming to love or recognize excellences at all. Lastly, I offered the more vague
suggestion that the criterion might account for the sufficient conditions of a person’s ethical
ordering of value and epistemic access to the features of transcendence.
49

Brewer’s practical epistemology enumerated in his theory of dialectical activities,
character friendship, and the good life provide precisely these needs. The criterion of higherorder excellences Finite requires is, I suggest, a criterion of dialectical activities and character
friendships seen as constitutive of the good human life (friendship and life themselves both being
dialectical activities). I will first give a quick summation of dialectical activities and then fill in
the theory by arguing its fit within Finite. Dialectical activities and the goods picked out by
dialectical activities are the kind which would be reasonable to love and which give the needed
superlative sense to the excellences they involve. Dialectical activities are those complex,
temporally extended activities which we “throw ourselves into” on an intimation of their intrinsic
value and, once engaged, struggle to better understand their constitutive standards and the source
of their value. Examples of those goods we engage in dialectical activities are philosophy, the
creation or appreciation of music, parenting, loving friendships and romantic relationships,
athletics, meaningful conversation, the creation or appreciation of artwork, scientific inquiry, and
mathematics.
What is common among this wide array of excellent activities is that their engagement
cannot be fully articulated and none of their goods can really be explained to those that have not
experienced them internally (a common experience for philosophers in particular). Further, full
participation in any of these activities requires attentional absorption and a running sense of their
value for a person to really be participating in them. If one does not see any point to what one is
doing or one’s mind drifts free of one’s doings, then one ceases to fully participate in the
activity. A lack of full participation yields a corresponding lack of growth or enjoyment. They
all provide a depth of engagement which requires active participation to discern how to answer
better and worse to the standards which constitute that engagement. In a constant and fluid
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process, as one comes through participation to better understand how to better engage in a
dialectical activity, this is reflected in one’s participation and a further round of discernment
through activity begins. The deeper one’s appreciation of the activity, the better one comes to
answer to this appreciation. They also all involve constitutive standards which determine the
character of engagement and whether a person engages in them at all. Engaging in a
conversation requires that I listen to my partner and respond aptly to what they say. If I
endeavor to engage in a conversation with a person, but ignore their expressions and fail to
respond appropriately to what they say, then I have begun to engage in something besides
conversation.70
II.2 A dialectical standard as necessary condition
I suggest that dialectical activities, by their temporal extension, intrinsic value, and
epistemic component, carve up excellences into those of higher and lower orders. The lower
excellences are those which lie outside of dialectical activities, the higher excellences are those
which can be engaged dialectically. Further, it is a part of the nature of dialectical activities that
the intelligibility, importance, and meaning of instantiations of the activity depend on the larger
activity. An instrumental jam session is not possible for a person independently of their
temporally extended activity of playing the instrument. A first kiss which evolves into a loving,
lifelong relationship gains the depth of its beauty and meaning from this longer dialectic. So,
there is also a distinction between the higher excellence of the extended activity and the higher
excellence of the fragmentary instance of the activity. Dialectical activities are not the highest
excellence though, for they are themselves dependent on the higher excellence of what is
engaged. The dialectical activity of a loving relationship with another person depends on the
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deep value of that person such that an ever more discerning understanding of their value and how
to best respond to that value are possible.
By preliminary example, the fragmentary higher excellence of a gourmet meal71 is not
really appreciated as excellent unless the extended higher excellence of cooking or savoring have
been extensively engaged. The depth of the meal’s value is only discernible within this yet
deeper good. This means that any particular excellence, to be really loved as excellent, requires
extensive engagement with relevantly similar particulars. It is the possibility of this extended
engagement which picks out the higher excellences. A young child could, of course, enjoy an
excellent meal. Yet they would hardly enjoy it as excellent, except in a shallow and infirm
sense. This is why they would usually prefer chicken nuggets. The higher temporally extended
excellences necessarily pick out higher fragmentary excellences, because their temporal
extension relies on a certain depth in their objects. So, the standard I suggest picks out the
higher, temporally extended goods and these in turn pick out higher from lower fragmentary
goods.
The asymmetry here is important, because fried chicken paste does not really allow of the
dialectical activities of savoring or cooking. Once one has eaten or microwaved frozen chicken
nuggts a few times, the depth of their value has run out. This is how dialectical activities disbar
base biological drives from contributing to wellbeing or fitting as a motivational ideal. Those
goods which are not fit objects of dialectical engagement are the lower excellences which
persons who do not make an effort to appreciate excellence would not only appreciate, but cling
to. In more direct terms from Finite, those who do not love the good would be picked out by
their lack of dialectical participation with higher-order goods.
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The dialectical standard can now be related back to the problem of practical vacuity
argued in A.IV.1. When we get advice from friends and family or consult an authority on an
issue, we seek those with wisdom in the area of our concern. The dialectical criterion makes
good sense of this phenomenon, because dialectical engagement produces wisdom or
understanding. It rescues Finite from practical vacuity by establishing the superlative sense of
excellence in relativizing an individual’s predication of excellence to the dialectical wisdom of
that individual. A friend’s assertion of a movie’s excellence would be indexed to my knowledge
of her extensive engagement with the dialectical activity of appreciating movies. This makes
sense of why I do not see the same value in a similar assertion from a neophyte and why my
practical reasoning from each will be different. An assertion of a lover’s beauty will have this
same indexing, because it is the extended experience between both which makes sense of the
expressive potency of the claim. A person’s internal practical reasoning from judgments of love
and excellence will have this same mark, because it is only by the temporally extended
experience with relevantly similar particulars that we can make such a judgment or trust our
judgments of love or excellence as reliable to our practical reason.
It may be objected that lower excellences like chicken nuggets or base biological drives
can become part of larger dialectical activities. The biological drive for sex could be part of the
dialectical activity of intimate sex with one’s spouse or junk food could be made gourmet or
approached from the scientific perspective of a laboratory nutritionist. Far from an objection,
this is just dialectical activities respecting Finite’s expansion of excellence by providing a
criterion which is largely dependent on personal approach. Recall that in section A, I highlighted
Adams’s struggle to define the excellences of natural vitality as open to placement in a
motivational ideal, while biological drives as such do not fit. A dialectical criterion parses out
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this distinction perfectly, because anything we might consider intuitively to be a lower good can
be made higher. The turning of base biological drives into important contributors to the welllived life or an integrative motivational ideal is merely a matter of dialectical engagement. Even
such a typically distrusted biological drive as the human tendency to violence can be made
excellent in the activities of jujitsu or boxing. The dialectical criterion vindicates Adams’s
assertion of the natural excellence of our vitality.72 There is a perspectival aspect to dialectical
activities which depends on both the possibility of dialectical engagement, and that the activity is
intrinsically valued. Thus, it is only those goods approached through dialectical activities which
are integrative into a motivational ideal and which contribute to wellbeing.
II.3 Dialectical standard as sufficient condition
This perspectival aspect has an epistemic feature which also makes sense of why
Adams’s standard of ‘enjoyment of excellence' alone was so ripe for repugnant parody. I
suggest that excellences must be enjoyed as excellent to contribute to wellbeing or a personal
ethical scheme. Moreover, dialectical activities are the only available route to the achievement
of really seeing an excellence as excellent. My assertions here turns on the difference between
an ill-formed hint that a thing is worthy of love and a more fully formed understanding. A
person might get a hint of poetry’s beauty in the first poem they read, but the depth of poetry
does not allow of such quick access to its inner value; the value is only found internally within
the extended activity of reading poetry. So, that a good should be made into a higher-order good
is the burden of understanding a thing as excellent and loving its excellence. I think this is what
we would expect, if Adams’s transcendence thesis is correct and the world is diffused with
Godlikeness.
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The recognition of aspects of transcendence would not jump out at children and those
who lack experience with particulars, for the same reason there are no ethical prodigies. An
Augustine or Nygren could not have gained their theistic insights, from which Adams pulls, as
youths.73 Insights into goodness and thereby into God require comprehensive, dialectical
engagement with goods. Adams cites agreement and disagreement with Nygren at several points
on the nature of God’s love. But neither of them could have a robust notion of love about which
to argue, without having themselves engaged in lengthy loving relationships. Their knowledge
of love, what it means to love someone or something, would not be possible otherwise. One
reason transcendence is ill-suited to serve as an ethical standard without a standard of higher
goods, is because of the dependence of any personal idea of transcendence on developed, higher
goods.
At the same time, a real appreciation of poetry’s excellence will require the absorptive
appreciation in the activity which just is enjoyment of its excellence. Under normal conditions,
knowing the goodness of a thing and enjoying its goodness often appear in tandem. This is
Brewer’s Aristotelian standard of pleasure: that full absorption as time seems to flow by is the
phenomenological marker of engagement with a vivid awareness of value.74 The achievement
of knowledge of the good is not limited to elitist goods like poetry, but all goods. The mindless
consumption of junk culture and junk food does not fit the standard of wellbeing or an
integrative motivational ideal, because mindless consumption only fits the illusion of enjoyment.
This is not Millian deck-stacking against lower pleasures, but a denial that those ‘pleasures’ fit
any real standard of enjoyment at all.75 There is no vivid awareness of value or wanting nothing
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more than to continue the doing. It turns out that Brewer’s theory of dialectical interaction
vindicates Adams’s own effort to limit his motivational ideal of love for the good by love as
enjoyment.76 What Finite required was a standard of the achievement of understanding goodness
which stresses a more active, not passive, experience with goods and the attendant pleasure in
excellence.
In stressing the epistemic and pleasurable aspect of dialectical activities, I am closing in
on my claim of Brewer’s theory of dialectical activities as sufficient for ethical ordering and
wellbeing. Not only are dialectical activities sufficient for knowledge and enjoyment of what is
worthy of love, I suggest that they are also sufficient for a proper ordering of value and for
wellbeing. In this, the further insight is gained that living well and doing well are not properly
separable. Retrieval’s theory of dialectical activities will need to be more fully developed to
demonstrate this sufficiency. Two closely related aspects will show this point: the burden of
autonomy and the role of character friendships. Before setting into their elucidation, it should be
noted that all dialectical activities require “propitious conditions” in opportunities, personal
ability, etc., so the need for a certain degree of luck is built-in.77
First, the theory of dialectical engagement is constrained by a distinctly moral conception
of autonomy and the achievement of self-directed activities. For a person to engage in a
dialectical activity, he must at least approximate a fully-formed self who reasons coherently from
a sense of non-dualistic goodness. Without the necessary coherence, the person dissolves into a
disordered multiplicity that can only be superficially regarded as a self, because it lacks the
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inner-agreement necessary for autonomous self-direction.78 Second, this coherence is not
possible for humans in isolation from one another, but can only be achieved through character
friendships. Without character friendships, a person would be adrift in their efforts to achieve
the coherent evaluative outlook required for self-direction. Engagement in the dialectic of a
loving relationship is not just a prime example of dialectical activity; it is a necessary activity for
the autonomy which is required for real engagement in any activity.
This rough sketch of the fully-formed theory of the dialectical criterion shows its
sufficiency for wellbeing and an ethical motivational ideal by its standard of values which
demands relational ordering and the development of the achievement of love. By the burden of
autonomy, it raises the stakes for the development of an integrative motivational ideal such that a
rough fitting of this proper relation carries more weight. Adams allows that the consequence of a
person’s not possessing an ordered scheme of values hates an aspect of themselves in an internal
war of motivations.79 This turns out to be underselling integration by love for the good, because
what is at stake is the formation of the self and the capacity for love at all.
The importance of a developed capacity for love is carried further by the importance of
character friendship. Part of the ideal of character friendship is coming to an intersubjectively
self-affirmable evaluative outlook which is indicative of autonomous coherence. Through
mutual love and admiration with a character friend, we come by dialectical engagement to hold
an evaluative outlook which is completely affirmed as intersubjectively coherent in the eyes of
another.80 The mutual love between such ideal friends brings them into closer evaluative
coherence with one another as each struggles to possess the virtue which will make them worthy
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of the other’s love. By this process, the achievement of autonomy and an outlook which
approaches affirmability across all relevant social perspectives, arrive simultaneously. In a deep
way, the capacity for subsidiary loves is parasitic on this primary love. The ethical burden of
such a character friendship is great, but by its integrative ordering of value and generation of the
capacity to love, its practical and epistemic criterion of excellence is thus a sufficient condition
for Finite’s motivational ideal and wellbeing.
Yet wouldn’t such a finite standard of excellence involve the flaw of idolatry by its
misidentification of human love as the highest ethical ideal? Not at all, if character friendship is
incorporated as the best route to love for the good. In the first place, the mutual pruning of
evaluative outlooks could partly go by way of the critical stance which Adams sees as a vital
ethical mechanism.81 Indeed, such a mechanism of criticality could be part of character friends’
view to self-affirmability, such that they never fully achieve an outlook they feel comfortable
regarding with fully intersubjective or universal self-affirmation. All the dialectical criterion
requires is the supplementary constraint that their evaluations of self-affirmability should
consider God’s perspective as the most important relevant social perspective. Second, the
dialectical standard does not generate idolatry because the achieved understanding of love, as
stated above, is necessary for an achieved ideal of God’s love. So, the love between the ideal
character friends would not eclipse God, but make possible a deep love for the transcendent
Good. It seems like this is supported by wide religious emphasis on the sacrament of marriage,
though of course romantic love is not the only form of character friendship.
The dialectical criterion seems to work hand in glove with Finite. It provides both
necessary and sufficient conditions for its ethical theory and prevents practical vacuity. There
81
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may be a worry that it offends against Finite’s concern for egalitarianism. Dialectical activities
do require some luck of circumstance and ability, might be taken to be inaccessible to most
people, and may offend against Finite’s view of the value of persons as persons. The
requirement of luck and ability is not, though, overly burdensome, just that a person needs a
passable upbringing and the good fortune not to be blighted in life. Adams has already brought a
fair amount of luck into the equation of wellbeing by the condition of enjoyment and any ethical
theory will require that an ethical valuing only be possible for an ethical person. Also,
dialectical activities are distinct and important, but ultimately attainable to most people in most
circumstances if they cultivate a suitable disposition. Friendship and parenting are not goods of
the economically elite. Last, the dialectical criterion does not offend against the value of persons
as persons, because the ontological status of the sacred and what is good for the sacred could
hardly be said to conflict.
III. Thin transcendence in Retrieval
With the argument for dialectical excellence in Finite out of the way, the remainder of
this section is devoted to the Retrieval side of the synthetic project. Whereas the theory of
dialectical activities seemed almost ready-made to work as Finite’s criterion of excellence, the
effort to read transcendence into Retrieval will be more of a process. The first step in the process
is to show that a thin version of transcendence is already at work in Retrieval and that a thicker
version transcendence, like Adams’s, would eliminate the problem of subjectivism.
III.1 Retrieval’s employment of thin transcendence
I hold that Retrieval’s deployment of value already possesses the characteristics of
transcendence, but without the metaphysical thickness of Finite’s transcendence thesis. That
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Retrieval relies on an implicit theory of transcendence is shown in three points: (1) goodness
transcends human understanding, (2) value permeates the world of experience, but is not
projected or constructed, and (3) there is a highest good by which subordinate goods are ordered
and understood. As these three features are listed, they represent more to less interpretive
aspects of the good in Retrieval. I will now work through them piecemeal in demonstration of
their accuracy.
First, the role of the good in Retrieval transcends our understanding because it is
ineffable and beyond reduction. The good is real and external, but its source and nature is
mysterious. We reason from goods as if they are objective and external, but their nature
precludes reduction or precision. The intrinsic values which guide our thoughts and actions
cannot be reduced to natural properties or propositionally reduced at all. Even when we come
close to understanding the particular goodness of a good engaged in dialectical activity, the
goodness defies any personal completion. It is the nature of dialectical activities that the good
which you inchoately intimate and which drives you to “throw yourself” into them recedes as
your understanding progresses.82 Desires for goods engaged dialectically are fugitive in content
and grasp, because dialectics do not allow of perfection. Persons or philosophy or music cannot
be grasped completely or with finality, because their depth makes the assertion of such
attainment an empty boast. Indeed, it would be a hollow claim indicative of the claimer’s
obvious lack of the stated attainment. A claim to understand philosophy in its entirety would be
nearly unintelligible— intrinsic goods are not that kind of thing.
Second, though the first-personal evaluative outlook on the good is guided by the
subjective personal experiences which sculpt that outlook, value cannot be anything like a
82
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projection or Kantian-style category of goodness. It must be externally real by demand of
practical primacy. It is a recurrently important step in Retrieval’s arguments to denounce
constructivist or internalist theories of practical reason and value. Yet, the example of the
distinctness of the practical contours of experience on B-15 would, on its face, suggest precisely
this conclusion. This is another part of the importance of the analogy with transcendental
idealism given in section B, where it may have appeared strained or superfluous: practical
idealism cannot utilize anything like the discursivity of transcendental idealism. Though the
practical dimension of any experience is shaped by the distinctness of the experiencing
perspective, the values distinct perspectives track must non-naturally permeate the world of
experience. Evaluative outlooks are not projections, but carvings from an inexhaustible world of
value.
Third, the good is not only transcendent and immanent in the world, but also hierarchical.
This last point falls on Brewer’s grounding value claims in a theory of the good human life. The
theory of dialectics which structure our lives and experience by their place in the process of
coming to see and live by the good, is itself grounded in common features of the good human
life. An essential part of what it means to understand the value of an activity is to properly value
its place relative to other values in a “full and flourishing human life.” An understanding of an
activity’s value is not a separable, surd quality which might be fully achieved in isolation from
any other considerations, because a person who pursues a value when it is inappropriate shows
himself to misunderstand that value.83 Given my limited resources and capacities, an important
feature of my life is figuring out when an action would be ill-suited, particularly for living a good
life. Part of what figuring out what a good life will mean for me is finding which actions are
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conducive to it. Brewer thinks it is only through experience with a diverse array of dialectics
that I can ever achieve this needed perspective. So, the proper ordering of intrinsically valuable
activities against one another and against instrumental values, is the “master activity of making
use of our capacity for practical thinking in the unshirkable task of leading a life.”84
The ideal ordering, plus luck, is the eudaimon life of unimpeded, pleasurable activity in
accordance with virtue. But eudaimonia cannot be the highest good in light of which the master
task of ordering the pursuit of lesser values is guided, because the proper ordering just is
eudaimonia. To hold eudaimonia as both the proper ordering and the good which guides the
proper ordering would create incoherence with Brewer’s larger theory. Since the highest good
would then be the internal organization of lesser goods guiding itself, this would generate
internalism about the highest good which flatly contradicts Brewer’s realism. Further, given the
plurality of flourishing lives, there must be some shared highest good which informs their
distinct eudaimon dialectic. I conclude that the hierarchical picture of lesser transcendent goods
intimately related to a highest transcendent good is thus a crucial element of Brewer’s theory.
III.2 Transcendental good as thickly transcendent good
It seems to me that the best way to understand these three features of the good is that
Brewer already implicitly uses a thin version of the transcendence thesis which, in its thicker
form, explicitly guides Adams. Since Retrieval’s use of the good already possesses the features
of transcendent, ineffable values which permeate reality and are closely related to a highest good,
the good is thinly transcendent. The thick transcendence thesis in Finite is of goods as unified
around and parasitic on an infinite and transcendent good which is the exemplar of intrinsic
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value. The transcendent Good provides a robust unification of goods and an ideal of love for the
transcendent Good as a common motivational ideal. Pertinent to present concerns, the
sharedness of this metaphysical source of value also secures objectivity among perspectives on
value judgments. In a way, tracking and appreciating transcendence is the shared task of all
persons.
I suggest that the thinness of Brewer’s theory of transcendent value is causing the illness
of subjectivism and that thicker transcendence is its cure. His value realism already relies on a
thin conception of transcendent goodness. A thicker definition would provide the objective
sharedness required for the practical perspective. At least two paths lie open in the task of
employing thick transcendence to ground objectivity between practical reasoners. One would be
a direct application of Finite’s theistic metaphysics of value. Interesting avenues of support lay
open here. Adams offers a brief cosmological argument for transcendence that the beauty of a
truth should be taken for the cause of its truth. I think what I have interpreted as the ‘principle of
practical primacy’ could very well support such an appeal to beauty as a truth-maker for the
adoption of a theistic metaphysics.
However, this metaphysical route also conflicts with Retrieval’s method of ontological
avoidance, as I noted on B-17. Brewer clarifies his realism: “The task of practical thinking is not
to ascertain the mere existence of entities that happen to be normative. The task is to come to an
understanding of how best to live and to live in the light of that understanding.”85 To cater to the
practical perspective, I suggested in the previous section that the objectivizing source needed for
practical idealism, its transcendental good, be conceived along purely epistemic lines. The
second path in employment of Adams’s transcendence thesis, the one I propose, is to re-ground
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transcendence along these practically epistemic constraints. This can be done by reconceiving
the transcendent Good as an exemplar of evaluative outlook, rather than an exemplar of all value.
It will be the perspective of the transcendent Good as an intentional being, which will be primary
in the transformed account. The face I will argue this transformation should take is that of a
normative definition of community.
IV. Community as Transcendent and Transcendental Good
There is an objective and subjective perspective on the sense of community I have in
mind. The subjective perspective is the place of community in practical reasoning. The
objective looks to what the community must be like to fit thick transcendence. This subsection
provides a rough sketch of what a community must look like to fit Adams’s constraints and
Brewer’s needs in establishing the needed synthesis by transcendence. I begin with
considerations specifically related to the prevention of subjectivism in practical idealism. These
are Retrieval’s requirements of the community in eunoia for character friendships and the
screening of thick evaluative concepts. I then move to a sketch of the ideal of community which
is to reground Adams’s transcendent Good and thereby act as the transcendental object of
Brewer’s practical idealism. These are intentionality arising from evaluative coherence and
transcendent judgment arising from collective efforts at evaluative clarity
IV.1 Retrieval’s need for transcendent community as transcendental good
There were a few features of Retrieval which needed the transcendental good and
suggested its social grounding. The first is that practical idealism seems to occlude truly shared
experiences, meaningful communication, and character friendship between two people with a
disparate evaluative outlook generated by their distinct practical experiences, yet, importantly,
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who share a common culture and live decidedly eudaimonistic lives. A shared source of the
good between these two opens up at least the possibility of shared views and communication on
important shared social or political issues and perhaps even the possibility of character
friendship. The second is a specific aspect of the first issue that practical idealism dooms an
individual’s efforts to sort the thick evaluative concepts by which they interpret and interact with
the world to a stilted and subjective standard. Because practical idealism prevents the possibility
of truly, dialectically meaningful communication, much less friendship, between disparate but
equally excellent lifestyles, one’s possible character friends will necessarily possess serious
limitations on the differences of their evaluative outlook from one’s own. Yet inter-social
dialogue is essential to the achievement of a nuanced evaluative ordering which might offer the
sort of objective outlook on the world of value which establishes autonomy and allows full
involvement in character friendship.
So, interestingly, Brewer is right in holding that autonomy and character friendships
possess a decidedly moral content that makes one’s achievement of both in tandem an ideal
which is composssible for all, but wrong that this compossibility is accessible for atomistic
character friends. Considerations of character friendship’s political and cultural setting are as
important to the self’s possibility of autonomy or character friendship, because for the sort of
unbiased value-tracking outlook which makes possible true virtue, and the same of true
autonomy and friendship, a society must be either extremely homogenous or more socially
dynamic in its pluralism than Brewer allows.
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IV.2 The community’s burden of eunoia and evaluative conceptual coherence
The sense of community I look to employ is of groups of people who loosely share an
evaluative understanding displayed by their shared set of values, particularly thick evaluative
concepts. Communities are comprised of subcommunities which have characteristics close to
the community which they comprise, but in their focus lack the completeness offered by the
transcendent community. Particular regional communities like cities and more dispersed
communities like scientific, artistic, or ethnic communities are the sort of subcommunities I
mean. Whether it is a maximal, global community or the political community of a modern
nation or a particular city, the scope of what is a community or subcommunity will depend
entirely on the needs of the practical perspective. The only real limitation on scope, for reasons
apparent below, is that the community should itself be comprised of a diverse range of
subcommunities.
This grounding in community must provide the background conditions such that the
eunoia necessary for character friendship is a broad social possibility. Brewer states that eunoia
is the foundational affection from which character friendship springs and is therefore necessary
for its possibility between two people.86 For the shared evaluative understanding which must be
derived from a network of character friendship (both for the sake of individual and communal
correctness of evaluation) to be achieved, a widespread and mutual eunoia among citizens must
be present. This may seem to generate the threat of a vicious circle, because the sense of
community which just is general social eunoia is necessary for the establishment of such a
community as might generate such eunoia. Yet, I think that this just is Brewer’s assertion that
those who have never had a sense of human value could not be instructed by argument as to its
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worth87, applied to the community scale in eunoia. By parity of reasoning, while eunoia will be
brutely necessary to begin the process of community formation, the theory of community
presented here will need to involve eunoia in holding it together.
In section B, I argued that Brewer’s position on thick evaluative concepts and its
mechanism for providing objectivity were flawed because his test of socio-historical
decomposition could be misapplied and because it does not capture the larger social process as it
occurs. The standard I suggest to supplement Retrieval’s method is the transcendently good
community’s considered evaluative outlook when it incorporates, by the efforts of its
subcommunities, the sorting of evaluative concepts by its members in a coherent set.
On the ground, when the testing of thick evaluative concepts against each other goes
well, it already takes this form. If I find a faulty evaluative concept maligns me unfairly, I am
likely to discuss it with others like me to discern whether they feel the same. Often, though not
always, I will be communicating with a subcommunity and will hope to push, as a
subcommunity, for the broader community to renounce the concept. If I am earnest in my
sorting of evaluative concepts for faulty concepts which do not affect me, I will require both the
testament of those persons whom they do affect expressed as the considered conviction of their
subcommunity and the larger community’s position on this view. If I am at pains to mine my
positive thick evaluative concepts for those which deserve special prominence or for new
evaluative concepts which track new goods and virtues, then I will often rely on communaly
shared views of exemplars of those concepts. By way of my character friends, I will both
express and encourage my outlook on evaluative concepts and gain from their own considered
views.
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This, anyway, is more or less how I think we have arrived at the current ‘politically
correct’ general set of shared evaluative concepts. It is the social process of a pluralistic society
at work in what might meaningfully be called its own edification. Often the process has yielded
massive conceptual improvement, though quite commonly false value concepts weasel in and
true value concepts fall out of favor. Yet always the assortment and ordering which is to
represent my distinct and unique outlook falls in the final view on me. Since by practical
idealism’s lights these very concepts will order my experience and activity in the world and
constitute with whom I am character friends, my personal set is, in a significant sense, who I am.
Practical primacy is represented in this process by the virtues’ constitution of the autonomous
self88, the undelegability of moral thinking89, and the necessity of character friends.
So far I have stressed social relations, the historical community, and communication
between sub-communities, but Retrieval itself makes reference to socially inherited doxastic
beliefs90 and the sorting process of socio-historical indexing and decomposition mentioned
above. Thick transcendence enters the picture in a degree of dynamism between the larger
community and the communities which comprise it. This is possible if the larger community
strives for its telos manifest in a disposition of being ‘for the good’ of its members. At the same
time, this sorting will just be the community’s striving for the inner coherence which is
constitutive of its agency and of its ideal as a community. By sorting through thick evaluative
concepts, the community shows itself to be for the good of each member within it by impressing
good-tracking evaluative concepts onto their evaluative sensibilities. A true community gives

88

Ibid., p 201
Ibid., p 104
90
Ibid., p270

89

68

individuals the conceptual resources to achieve the virtues necessary for their autonomy and the
growth of character friendship which is in turn necessary for the community’s existence.
IV.3 Requirements of Transcendence in the Community
What the community needs to do, as evaluative exemplar, is support a shared structure of
practical reason among its members. The community will be approached from both a top-down
and bottom-up perspectives, with the top-down perspective explored first. The bottom-up
perspective, elaborated in the next subsection, will be the role of community in the first-personal
view of practical reason. The top-down perspective will be the wider view of transcendent
characteristics the community must possess to fill its role. I will take up this wider perspective
first, making some assumptions on these details of the community, and look to justify these
assumptions later.
The community must possess an evaluative outlook that structures distinct and distant
practical perspectives to meet the role of securing objectivity among practical reasoners. For
simplicity, I will use Brewer’s example of different perspectives on the same buzzsaw referenced
in the previous section to demonstrate this point. It should be kept in mind that the ethical stakes
are higher than this suggests, because the practical perspectives they represent are structural
features of important types of lives and outlooks on value. The sound artist, mechanic, and
carpenter, though they cannot directly affirm each other’s outlooks on value, must each find
affirmation from the larger perspective of the community they comprise. The way I see this
working is that the subcommunities of likeminded individuals of which they are a part, of artists
or mechanics or carpenters, must affirm the practical structure which informs these individual
practical perspectives. Whereas the practical contours of the carpenter and artist may not allow
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of effective communication or understanding between the two, fellow artists and carpenters
would not possess this same limitation. Their experiences will be comparatively very close; they
could more naturally become character friends. The issue which the community must alleviate is
bridging this gap between subcommunities, rather than the individuals themselves. While each
practical perspective will be distinct, the problem of subjectivism would not arise if a large
homogeny of practical structure obtained between individuals.
In the case of a pluralistic (broadly define) society, the community must play a role of
containing these subcommunities in a way that their perspectives are unified in its perspective.
To fill this role, the community must have an evaluative outlook which is comprised of the
diverse range of the practical perspectives of its members. So, the community, to fit the
characteristics of transcendence, must be importantly like a person such that it might reasonably
be ascribed an evaluative outlook and this evaluative outlook must contain the conceptual
resources of its subcommunities. To speak loosely, this evaluative outlook will hang on the
shared thick evaluative concepts on offer to its members such that they can form a unified
network of character friendships. By unified, I do not mean that any astronaut or farmer needs to
be capable of character friendship. Rather, it is only that their subcommunities possess ties
through character friendships with each other. The burden of the network of character
friendships appears twofold at this juncture. First, divergent outlooks on value between
members of the same community should not preclude character friendship between two persons
living excellent lives. Such a coherent network of character friendships would also depend on
both widespread and shared eunoia among members for members qua members and a shared
stock of thick evaluative concepts, including the virtues and vices. Otherwise, the problem of
subjectivism, argued in the previous section, in atomistic character friendships and the sorting of
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thick evaluative concepts arises. Second, subcommunities which offer specialized evaluative
concepts that do occlude ties in its network of friendship should be actively discouraged by the
larger community.
The idealized set of coherently shared evaluative understandings among this network of
character friendships would be the community’s evaluative outlook. Brewer’s account of
autonomy (coherence in reasoning on the good) mapped on to the community can be employed
to render the needed degree of coherence for intentionality. This coherent evaluative outlook
secures the community’s agency and intentionality by the unity among subcommunities it makes
possible through the fairness of its thick evaluative concepts. Intentionality is important for a
transcendent Good because it must be ‘for the good’ of its members by willing that they possess
direction towards the good in their received evaluative concepts. It also must be capable of
relationship with each of its members by their relationship with one another proceeding by way
of its outlook expressed in their evaluative concepts. The coherence of evaluative outlook is
made possible by unity of membership and the collective judgments of members in arriving at a
shared set of evaluative concepts.
Further, it must judge excellence as excellent for its members. Community support for
excellence backs up practical idealism by its being the ideal judge of value in conjunction with
its judgments being for the good of its members. This feature helps establish the maximal
intersubjectivity which secures the objectivity of distinct outlooks on practical reason, because
the community’s larger perspective can recognize the values of the subcommunities. The
community’s place as an ideal judger of excellence is taken from the collective efforts of the
network of character friends to arrive at tenable, good-tracking sets of thick evaluative concepts.
In a sense, this just will be the eunoia of the community’s members striving for fair and just
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evaluative outlooks which do not unfairly disadvantage any subcommunity that supports .
Because the effort is collective, judgments of excellence at the community level will possess a
degree of nuance and objectivity which no individual could ever possess. Its outlook and
judgments on value are transcendent. Because the community is external and evaluatively
hegemonic, it prevents practical subjectivity by grounding our individual judgments of practical
reasons in a community of practical reasoners conceived as a practically reasoning community.
In Finite’s terms, the community so constituted can ground the needed relational ordering
among goods by its degree of transcendent value such that any good can be understood as
relational to aspects of the community. Translated to Retrieval’s needs, this value and its
ordering relation establish the shared practical outlook on the good which secures practical
idealism. Security in the practical is bound to intersubjectivity and the rectifications of
conceptual sorting and the possibility of diverse character friendships. Coherence of evaluative
outlook, unity among members, and the collective sorting of evaluative concepts are all
necessary for one another. Their reciprocity is reflected in their mutual support for the
community’s intentionality of being ‘for the good’ and its status as an ideal judge of excellences.
This mutuality has interesting connections with both Retrieval and Finite because the
community’s transcendent perspective depends on a completion of its virtues in which no aspect
could be possessed without the others. This connects with Adams’s insistence that the
transcendent Good, as the metaphysical ground of value, possess and actualize a completeness of
excellence which no person could ever achieve.91 It connects with Brewer’s Aristotelian
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intuition that the virtues are “unified in the sense that it is impossible to have one virtue in the
fullest degree if one lacks any other.”92
V. The place of the transcendent community from the practical perspective
Given the place of thick evaluative concepts in particularized ethical navigation, there is a
strong connection between ethics and community. In this subsection, I argue a more specific role
for the community in Retrieval in morality by way of synthesis with Finite’s theory of morality. I
begin the task of this subsection with a social theory of the right from the perspective of the
practical reasoner. I then endeavor to incorporate Adams’s divine command theory, suitably
transformed, into this larger perspective. I end by placing a community-affirmability restriction
on the right.
V.1 A Social Theory of the Right and the Practical Perspective
To begin I need to square the distinctness considerations of the right with the theory’s
commitment to monistic goodness in which moral value is not a realm of value distinct from
non-moral value. In addition, the transcendental good must be incorporated. My solution is an
account of shifting self/other valences in discernment of goods and the community’s evaluative
outlook. A valence shifting treatment of the derived from Brewer’s arguments against goodness
dualism can offer a suitable basis for distinguishing between practical considerations of good and
right. Good actions involving others have a primacy of relation to self, while right actions have a
primacy of relation to other. In both there is a self-other relation in our practical considerations,
but by putting more weight on one or the other, we can incorporate a distinction between the
right and the good which does not offend against monism. An explanation of this point will
require a social theory that provides a more subtle cutting between the distinctness of persons.
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In acting from considerations of what is right or what is owed, we deliberate from a
perspective which shrinks the gulf of distinctness between persons. We are inescapably
constrained by our first personal perspective and self-directed action depends on reasoning from
our relation to goodness. Yet we can stretch our understanding to consider reasons from a wider
perspective in communities which encompasses a richer, more objective outlook than our own.
In the limiting case, it is a community of two. This allows us to override our own protoevaluative seemings of goodness (desires, emotions, pleasures) to recognize what it would be
good to do despite our having no desire to do it. Brewer describes this doing what we have no
desire to do as accomplished through strained concentration. My suggestion is that, at least in
the case of right action, it is a strained concentration to consider things from an evaluative
perspective which is not an impersonal fiction, but a collective and agential outlook.
The view on offer avoids offending goodness monism by a subjectivism of the right.
When we reason practically from considerations of right, we are not considering a special and
overriding realm of value. Rather, we are stretching our evaluative outlook so as to reason from
an evaluative perspective which is almost always more trustworthy and socially judicious. Such
stretching is an instance of reason correcting desire, for we can hope that through habituation we
will come to see the right as good. What is now considered right will then become incorporated
into our evaluative outlook as good and desiring what is now right will be conferred. Though
sometimes doing what is right should never come to be felt as good, one can hope that it was
good from the larger social perspective.
My view here is illustrated in Brewer’s example of cleaning a communal bathroom as a
paradigmatic case of forcing myself to do what I have no desire to do. Take it that I would
ideally be acting from virtue out of a sense of obligation and not, for example, pragmatism. I
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might be fulfilling this obligation because I value my relations with the other toilet users, but I
may not be on good terms with them and still value the community. I would recognize, by
stretching my understanding, the value of the group’s evaluative outlook and its propriety in
sorting my personal good such that it aligns with the group good. I would then have reasoned
from the right to discern the good.
On the present theory, the right as an efficacious distinction will depend upon an
evaluative outlook which is only ever partially realized in fragmentary considerations, but
always present. At the highest level of abstraction it will be the transcendent outlook of the
transcendent good— the community which contains all subcommunities. This is the perspectival
aspect of the transcendental good securing morality at the practical level in the same way it
secures objectivity at the metaphysical or metaepistemological level. The adjudication between
how high considerations of communal perspective must go and the scope of such considerations
will be situationally dependent. Usually the task will take its most concrete form and fall on a
shared perspective between a self and an other. When this shared perspective is absent or claims
of requirement are faulty, a perspective which is shared might be found in a wider scope.
My synthesized theory allows a weak cultural relativity while denying a strong relativity.
It allows a weak cultural relativism for the good because such goods as dialectical activities, the
structure of character friends’ interactions, the possibility and structure of symbolic value, and
thick evaluative concepts are indexed to the practical reasoner’s background culture. In the
present case of the right, it is that the evaluative outlook of the community which we stretch to
appreciate when we do not naturally understand the good from its perspective, is indexed to the
actual community’s idealized perspective which we are employing. If we care to take the time
we can consider the larger communities in which the community we are considering nests and at
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the level of highest abstraction the maximal community in which all of our community
memberships arise. Such stretch of evaluative understanding will be difficult, narrow and likely
impossible for any one person and so must usually be undertaken as a group at the
subcommunity level. This is part of the importance of social leveraging in the sorting of thick
evaluative concepts. It denies a strong cultural relativism because such considerations will still
be checked at the individual level against standards of coherence and consistency to prevent an
idolatry associated with a lack of critical stance.
Considerations of rightness, then, are an important part of the phenomenological
evidence for the practical equivalent of the transcendental good. They represent a fragmentary
glimpse of a value which we can never understand in immediacy, but which practical reason
rests upon in insistence of its existence.
V.2 Initial problems for the practical theory of the right
The practical theory of the right depends on an evaluative parasitism which may suggest
certain unsavory consequences. The most problematic would be that a theory which indexes
outlooks on value to a transcendent community generates conflicts with practical primacy’s
rejection of reductionism. At the practical level, the value of persons is felt to be brute and
mysterious, but that the capacity for recognizing and acting from value should be so parasitic can
(1) seem to devalue autonomy and (2) suggest that our loves and actions must always be
rubberstamped by the community’s affirmation.
The first worry is easily dealt with by noting that the community’s evaluative outlook is a
product of individuals’ and that groups of practical reasoners develop nuanced and particularized
distinctions which no individual could achieve. The evaluative insight of a group of people,
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particularly at the community level, is simply degrees of magnitude more perspicacious than an
individuals’. It transcends any effort of individual discernment. In particular along the lines of
sorting thick evaluative concepts discussed above. What is more, the modern antagonistic
paradigm of individual-versus-community disapates with the fall of the personal/impersonal
goodness division. It turns on an utter misconception of the nature of value and autonomy and
on an unhealthy modern obsession with individuality.
The second worry, that we would lose the intimate relation between our loves and actions
and ourselves by indexing them to the community’s perspective, can be dispelled by allowance
of two points. One is that the community’s perspective is generally valid in that its considered
standards can show when our loves are unhealthy or deeply problematic (as in a one-sided or
abusive relationship or an obsessive activity). The other is that love’s particularity indicates that
it is only the community’s received standards of what love is and how to love that our personal
loves are dependent on from the practical perspective.
This brings up an important question of how we are to interact with communities such
that transcendence can be communally grounded. By conceiving of the community which is
reasonably flourishing as a network of character friendship, our actual character friends become
conduits of interaction with the community and thereby its achieved evaluative outlook. Given
the transcendent status of the community, it would be a classic category mistake to say, “I talked
with my neighbor and spouse and senator, but I never talked with the community”. When we
discuss and publicly deliberate through action and speech on values and the way the world is and
bring our evaluative perspective into greater social atunement, we just are interacting with a
community. In the ideal for our self and others, this will be the shared political community.
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V.3 Finishing the synthesis with Adams’s moral theory
I can now bring considerations back to Adams by the place of the right and moral
obligations. Finite’s moral theory can be placed within the evaluative outlook theory of monistic
goodness and the practical account of the right which I have offered so far, by adopting his
semantic description of obligation, guilt, and blame as a phenomenological taxonomy. Finite’s
practical realignment can thereby allow that those with whom we are socially related are the
foundation of obligations and that the objectivity and imperatival form of obligations is grounded
in our relationship with the transcendent community. On this synthesized view the
phenomenological markers of guilt and blame are strong indicators of the right in their capacity
to push our deliberations into a valence-shifted perspective. Such emotional content is important
input for our practical perspective. We reason from these inputs to deliberation and actions from
the attitudes which they generate.
Finite’s moral theory is pulled deeper still by the muddled nature of the obligatory/
supererogatory distinction. It is so muddled because the difference between obligatory and
supererogatory actions is typically lost on the virtuous; it is only in struggles to discern and meet
her obligations that such a distinction comes to light. It is the phenomenological markers of this
evaluative struggle, when the right and the good do not seem to line up, that provides the impetus
for this valence shift. My assertion is that when judging what others ask of us by this shift we do
more than ‘put ourselves in their shoes’. Counter to Adams’s position that obligations must arise
from actual requests, we attempt to judge obligations from what relations could or should ask of
us by creatively imagining our shared perspective. The first-personal perspective only allows us
to creatively imagine their perspective through our own, but even if we could accomplish the
task of ‘unselfing’ we would still be regarding a perspective which, if it is worthy of obligation,
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considers our own. It would be a perspective which reciprocally seeks to share an evaluative
outlook with our own in this situation common to each in the relation. In Retrieval’s terms, it
would need to at least approximate the character friends’ shared process of reflective evaluative
equilibrium, otherwise disagreement on the existence and content of obligation will be insoluble.
On the synthesized view, this is the transcendent community actively seeking to incorporate our
perspective in its own by way of its thick evaluative outlook.
The takeaway here is that shame, guilt, and blame do not explicitly enter our
considerations until we are engaged in the sort of valence-shifting struggle to deepen our grasp
of the situation. When we do so struggle, we are likely to consider the other’s view of the
relationship and our view in tandem with our perspective taken together as a shared, protocommunal perspective. When this perspective fails our needs, we find recourse in a broader
community’s perspective. We might solicit our friends and family for advice, imaginatively
consider the external perspective of a real or fictional exemplar or dwell on a parable or
colloquial rule of thumb. By our efforts to ‘get outside ourselves’ in all of these cases we are
tapping into a collective perspective which transcends our own limited experience to bring to
bear an outlook which establishes practical objectivity through its transcendent judgment and
grounded sharedness with others. Adams’s divine command theory, suitably transformed, begins
to find a place here. If our considerations fall on broadly accepted and roughly firm social
principles, whether negative or positive, then we will have followed something closer to explicit
commands from the community of which we are a part.
The moral treatment on offer corresponds with both Brewer’s commitment to a reverseHegelian history of philosophical progress and criticism of opposing views as expressive of
cultural calamity. By rejection of the utter separability of individual and community, I hope to
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extend the monistic view of the good which Brewer offers by way of recognition that the selves
which are the other half of the self/other collapse in goodness are an essential aspect of thought
as conceptually important distinctions in practical reason. Indeed, this just is recognition that
Brewer’s views of “actualizing the self”, unselfing in loving desires, rejection of dualistic good,
and primacy of the practical perspective are ill at ease together, because considerations of
self/other are essential to the practical perspective.
Everyone checks their selfishness by consideration of others in their moral reasoning and
if the conceptual distinction is efficacious then its reality is unquestionable by Brewer’s own
position. So, when there is a rejection of personal/impersonal divide in goodness, it cannot be a
total rejection of the conceptual efficacy of the divide because it is an important aspect of
practical reason. On the one hand, as much as monism is essential to autonomy, reasoning from
the self and other as distinct is also obviously necessary. Actualization of one’s good is not just
a mere byproduct of the first-personal perspective. It is one’s only perspective on the monistic
good and, as such, recognition of the self/other distinction in goods is as essential to the sort of
unique and good human life which displays autonomy as monistic reasoning. On the other,
reasoning from the good as monistic does not arise spontaneously, but requires shaping by the
evaluative concepts of altruism and selfishness.
To suggest that all persons strive for an ethical ideal which produces evaluative
compossibility is to suggest a bland and stilted ethical ideal which is ill-suited to the practical
perspective and the uniqueness of persons’ lives. My assertion is that by placing this conception
of morality and evaluative coherence arising out of character friendships in the broader habitat of
a transcendently excellent community, the substantive shortcomings of Brewer’s position are
alleviated and without damage or distortion to Retrieval’s ethical theory as it stands. Indexing
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atomistic character friendships to the molecules of subcommunities that make up the composite
community gives character friendships a constitutive ideal which limits the faults to which they
are prone. If an evaluative outlook cannot be affirmed from the community perspective when
that community meets the threshold of its ideal, then that character is deficient regardless of its
coherence. Further, the relationship which produced it does not meet the communalaffirmability condition, hence is not a true character friendship.
The individual’s evaluative outlook must meet both the condition of “self-affirmability
that is intersubjective, unreserved, and unconditional”93 and the condition of communalaffirmability which I have created. How, though, will the individual have access to such an
abstract condition of affirmation? The individual must take part in the larger endeavor of sorting
thick evaluative concepts by taking part either directly or indirectly in subsidiary character
friendships so that her primary “perfect character friendship” can approximate its ideal of
universal self-affirmability. By so taking part, the character friends’ evaluative outlooks will
secure their objectivity by prevention of the unmooring which plagues the pre-synthetic
formulation. In this way my supplemented character friendship theory establishes the
compossibility condition among members by limitation of their core outlook to one which is
necessarily compossible. Thus morality finds its place in the narrow phenomenological
perspective illustrated above and in the broader perspective of individuals’ taking their part
through character friendships in the highest dialectic of sculpting a community which is
transcendently valuable.

93

Ibid., p245
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VI. Conclusion
The synthesis of Retrieval and Finite is complete in the emendation of each by essential
theories of each. Retrieval’s theory dialectical activities fit nearly perfectly with the needs of
Finite. Alternately, reading Adams’s transcendent Good into the role of Brewer’s transcendental
good was more of a squeeze. The transcendent Good was first transformed into a transcendent
community constituted by the dynamic interplay of subcommunities which unify the community
in a network of character friendships. The evaluative outlook of this community both connects
with the practical perspective and is expressed in its thick evaluative concepts as they are
socially sorted for better and worse ethical guidance. A further connection was then made of the
subjective place of the right in practical deliberation and the role the transcendent community
might play in backing up morality.
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